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INTRODUCTION

Particularly during the last two decades under the formal leadership of Chief Justices Earl Warren and Warren Burger, the United
States Supreme Court has been widely recognized as a profoundly
influential policy-making institution in several significant areas.'
This recognition verifies the popular view that the law is in fact
what courts do and what the judges say it is. Knowledge of how the
Justices actually reached most of these landmark decisions remains
limited, however, principally because of the Court's long-standing,
self-imposed tradition of secrecy as well as scholarly reluctance to
abandon traditional conceptions of the nature of the judicial process. The purpose of this article is to suggest how the Court tends
to make decisions in critical policy issues by analyzing and modeling information flow to the Justices in three leading constitutional
cases-New York Timnes v. Sullivan,3 decided by the Warren Court
in 1964, and Roe v. Wade4 and Doe v. Bolton,5 announced by the
Burger Court in 1973.
A few students of the judicial process, aware of the key policymaking function of the Supreme Court in the American governmental system, have sought to construct various types of models for
describing, explaining, or predicting its decisions.' Rarely, however,
1. See generally A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); A.
Cox, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REFORM (1968); A.
GOLDBERG, EQUAL JUSTICE: THE WAREN ERA OF THE SUPREME COURT (1971); P. KURLAND,
POLrICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT (1970); Bickel & Wellington, Legislative
Purpose and the JudicialProcess: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957); Cox,
Foreword:ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Promotionof HumanRights, 80 HARV. L. REV.
91 (1966); Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observationson the Candor
and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971); Kurland, Foreword:
Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the
Government, 78 HARv. L. REV. 143 (1964); Lamb, The Making of a Chief Justice: Warren
Burger on Criminal Procedure, 1956-1969, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (1975); McCloskey,
Reflections on the Warren Court, 51 VA. L. REV. 1229 (1965); Mason, The Burger Court in
HistoricalPerspective, 89 POL. ScI. Q. 27 (1974); Swindler, The Court, the Constitution, and
Chief Justice Burger, 27 VAND. L. REV. 443 (1974); Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal
Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of ConstitutionalEquality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945 (1975);
Wright, ProfessorBickel, the Scholarly Tradition,and the Supreme Court, 84 HARv. L. REV.
769 (1971). See also the group of outstanding articles on the Warren Court appearing in 67
MICH. L. REV. 223-358 (1968).
2. See, e.g., 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 35 (1881); Holmes, The Path Of the Law,
10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897). See also Chief Justice Hughes and Mr. Justice Frankfurter
quoted in A. MASON & W. BEAN Y, THE SUPREME COURT INA FREE SOCIM 1 (1968).
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
6. See the discussion of judicial models in C. SHELDON, THE AMEmcAN JUDICIAL PROCESS:
MODELS AND APPROACHES (1974); Rigby & Witt, BibliographicalEssay: BehavioralResearch
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have these models emphasized the flow of information as policyrelated input to the members of the Court. Instead, emphasis
usually has been placed on the Court's outputs-the decisions that
impact upon everyday life and the workings of our legal, political,
social, and economic systems. Additionally, previous models have
not expressly relied upon concepts such as those found in communication or information theory. 7 Modeling of judicial information flow,
a crucial component in the Supreme Court's policy-making process,
therefore remains largely in the unexplored frontiers of judicial research.
As one observer has pointed out, the time is right for developing
models of judicial policy-making and the judicial process from
perspectives that have been heretofore virtually ignored,8 despite
the availability of related studies providing a factual basis for model
experimentation. A recent study by two law professors, Arthur S.
Miller and Jerome A. Barron, which examines in detail the information flow process to the Supreme Court in Times, Roe, and Doe, and
derives a number of propositions based upon those case studies,9
provides a unique opportunity for building new informationin PublicLaw, 1963-1967, 22 WEST. POL. Q. 622 (1969); Sheldon, Structuring a Model of the
JudicialProcess, 58 Gso. L.J. 1153 (1970); Ulmer, MathematicalModels for PredictingJudicial Behavior, in MATHEMATICAL APPLICATIONS INPOLITICAL SCIENCE 11 67 (J. Bernd ed. 1967).
Of course the complexity of different models varies greatly. On the one hand is the traditional
verbal model of Supreme Court policy-making. See, e.g., G. SCHUBERT, THE Ftrruan OF THE
NixoN COURT 13-14 (1972). On the other hand is the exceedingly complex mathematical
model. The sophistication of mathematical models is illustrated by the work of Professors
Fred Kort and Glendon Schubert. See, e.g., G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND REvisrrED:
PSYCHOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT IDEOLOGY (1974); G. Schubert, THE JUDICIAL MIND:
THE ATrrruDES AND IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, 1956-1963 (1965); Kort, Regression Analysis and DiscriminantAnalysis: An Application of R.A. Fisher'sTheorem to Data
in Political Science, 67 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 555 (1973); Kort, A Nonlinear Model for the
Analysis of Judicial Decisions, 62 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 546 (1968); Kort, Simultaneous
Equations and Boolean Algebra in the Analysis of Judicial Decisions, 28 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROS. 143 (1963); Kort, Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions and Rules of Law in JUDICIAL
DECISION-MAKING 133 (G. Schubert ed. 1963).
7. See Schubert, Judicial Processand Behavior, 1963-1971, 3 POL. Sc. ANN. 96 (1972);
Shapiro, PoliticalJurisprudence, 52 Ky. L.J. 294, 318 (1964). For works which are more or
less illustrative exceptions to this generalization see Ulmer, The DiscriminantFunction and
a Theoretical Context for Its Use in Estimatingthe Votes of Judges, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL
RESEARCH 335 (J. Grossman & J. Tanenhaus ed. 1969); Shapiro, Decentralized DecisionMaking in the Law of Torts, in POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING 44 (S. Ulmer ed. 1970). For a study
of information flow in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals see Carp, The Scope and Function
of Intra-CircuitJudicial Communication:A Case Study of the Eighth Circuit, 6 LAw & Soc'Y
REv. 405 (1972).
8. Fiorina, Formal Models in PoliticalScience, 19 AM. J. POL. SCI. 133, 147 (1975).
9. Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices:A PreliminaryInquiry, 62 VA. L. Rv. 1187 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Miller & Barron].
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oriented models of judicial process and policy-making.
This article is intended as an exploratory step toward filling the
gap in the literature by synthesizing the fragmentary knowledge
relating to judicial information flow. It attempts to advance the
dialogue initiated by Professors Miller and Barron by providing a
number of components necessary for an adequate model; it seeks
also to suggest additional considerations necessary for a more useful
model and thus for a continuing systematic inquiry into the information flow process. Results of the Miller-Barron article supply the
background for the work reported here. Times, Roe, and Doe and
the Miller-Barron findings are considered in the first two sections
respectively. Conclusions from these sections are then used to design an elementary inductive model of information flow to the Justices. This basic model is next expanded to include the entire judicial system and its environment-information flow to, through, and
back to Court members. On balance, therefore, the exploratory
model finally developed is of necessity eclectic in nature. It contains
both inductive and deductive elements, the former based upon explorations into specific cases, the latter founded on additional theoretical models.' 0
I.

FACTS, FINDINGS, AND POLICY-MAKING

The two major lines of Supreme Court cases that receive primary attention in this article and that of Professors Miller and
Barron" involve both Warren Court policy-making (New York
Times v. Sullivan) and Burger Court decisions (Roe v. Wade and
Doe v. Bolton). Case facts (as types of information) and Court findings (reflecting apparent interpretations of information) in these
decisions must be recounted here because of their importance in
understanding the Miller-Barron article, and in constructing and
explaining a model of Supreme Court information flow.
In Times,'2 the Warren Court announced a landmark first
10. Appendix A summarizes related results of a questionnaire survey of law and political science professors concerning questions of information flow to the Supreme Court.
11. The authors originally intended to examine information flow in four other constitutional areas: racial segregation, economic due process, search and seizure, and trial by jury.
See the introductory footnote to Miller & Barron, supra note 9.
12. For treatments of Times see, e.g., Berney, Libel and the FirstAmendment-A New
ConstitutionalPrivilege, 51 VA. L. REV. 1 (1965); Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz
v. Welch: Ten Years of BalancingLibel Law and the FirstAmendment, 26 HA5SnNGS L.J. 777
(1975); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191; Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel:
A Modern Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 581 (1964); Pierce, The Anatomy of an
Historic Decision: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 43 N.C.L. REv. 315 (1965); 52 CORNELL
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amendment decision in the case law concerning constitutional protection of freedom of expression. In so doing, the Court modified the
traditional rules of libel by imposing constitutional standards upon
them and demonstrated its capacity to formulate policy without
adhering to "neutral principles" of constitutional decisionmaking. 3 The respondent in Times was L.B. Sullivan, one of three
city commissioners elected by the voters of Montgomery, Alabama.
Sullivan, in a civil action brought in an Alabama court, argued that
critical comments appearing in a paid editorial advertisement in the
March 29, 1960, issue of the New York Times, had libeled him
through accusations of misconduct aimed at the Montgomery police, for whose conduct he was officially responsible. He argued that
the accusations were directed toward him even though he was not
specifically named.'4
Some of the allegations made by the advertisement were subsequently shown to be erroneous, and others accurately portrayed
events that occurred prior to the date that Sullivan became city
commissioner.'" At trial, the jury found for Sullivan and awarded
him general damages because, under the Alabama rule, the advertisement's accusations were found to be "libelous per se," false, and
printed with malice by the newspaper." The Supreme Court of AlaL. REv.419 (1967); 78 HAv. L. REv. 201 (1964); 113 U. PA. L. REV. 284 (1964); 18 VAND. L.
REv. 1429 (1965); 51 VA. L. REV. 106 (1965).
13. See generally Kalven, supra note 12, particularly at 192, referring to Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1959). Consider also:
Jerome A. Barron's comment that Times "is an example of judicial law making; but it is
incomplete law making," J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? THE RIGHT OF AcCESS
TO MASS MEDIA 11 (1973); Samuel Krislov's assessment that "[t]he political usage of the
First Amendment lies at the root of the New York Times v. Sullivan decision . . . ," S.
KRiSLOV, THE SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL FREEDOM 34 (1968); Willard Pedrick's view that
Times "represents a distinct departure from past constitutional development, it surmounts
rather than interprets some language of the Constitution, and it does all of this to adopt a
rule of law rejected by a heavy majority of state courts called upon to consider the matter,"
Pedrick, supra note 12, at 587; and Arthur Berney's remark that "the Court in Sullivan clearly
failed to seize upon the narrowest constitutional grounds available in reaching its decision,"
Berney, supra note 12, at 17.
14. 376 U.S. 254, 258 (1964).
15. Id. at 258-59.
16. A critical distinction exists between the awarding of general damages (under which
malice is presumed) and punitive damages (under which actual malice must be proven). This
distinction, and the fact that it was not embodied in related jury instructions, was summarized by the Court as follows:
The trial judge submitted the case to the jury under instructions that the statements
in the advertisement were "libelous per se" and were not privileged, so that petitioners
might be held liable if the jury found that they had published the advertisement and
that the statements were made "of and concerning" respondent. The jury was instructed
that, because the statements were libelous perse, "the law. . . implies legal injury from
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bama affirmed the decision, denying the claims of the Times based
upon the first and fourteenth amendments.
Mr. Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Times addressed
"for the first time the extent to which the constitutional protections
for speech and press limit a State's power to award damages in a
libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official
conduct.""7 The Court ruled that the advertisement appearing in
the Times fell within the protection of the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech and press. 8 It was not a "commercial"
advertisement in the customary sense; 9 rather, it was an "editorial
advertisement" that "communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievance, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives
are matters of the highest public interest and concern.""0 Such advertisements perform an extremely useful function in facilitating
political expression in American society, according to Brennan's
policy-making premise:
Any other conclusion would discourage newspapers from carrying "editorial
advertisements" of this type, and so might shut off an important outlet for the
promulgation of information and ideas by persons who do not themselves have
access to publishing facilities-who wish to exercise
their freedom of speech
2
even though they are not members of the press. '

Underlying assumptions of this line of reasoning are that the
protection of editorial advertising under the first amendment will
the bare fact of publication itself," "falsity and malice are presumed," "general damages
need not be alleged or proved but are presumed," and "punitive damages may be
awarded by the jury even though the amount of actual damages is neither found nor
shown." An award of punitive damages-as distinguished from "general" damages,
which are compensatory in nature-apparently requires proof of actual malice under
Alabama law, and the judge charged that "mere negligence or carelessness is not evidence of actual malice or malice in fact, and does not justify an award of exemplary or
punitive damages." He refused to charge, however, that the jury must be "convinced"
of malice, in the sense of "actual intent" to harm or "gross negligence and recklessness,"
to make such an award, and he also refused to require that a verdict for respondent
differentiate between compensatory and punitive damages. The judge rejected petitioners' contention that his rulings abridged the freedoms of speech and of the press that
are guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. at 262-63.
17. Id. at 256.
18. The Court was unanimous in Times, but in addition to Justice Brennan's opinion
were concurring opinions authored by Justices Black and Goldberg, both of which were joined
by Justice Douglas. These three members of the Court generally felt that Times did not go
far enough toward guaranteeing the right of public criticism of elected officials' conduct.
Indeed, they concluded that this was an absolute right. See id. at 296, 298.
19. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
20. 376 U.S. at 266.
21. Id.
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promote the exchange of diverse political and social views, stimulate public debate over momentous questions, provide some form of
public access to the media, and ultimately contribute to placing a
more informed electorate in a better position to hold their elected
officials accountable. 2 In the words of Justice Brennan, "[w]e consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials. '2' 3 The problem is where to strike
a balance between fundamental competing constitutional valuesto regulate maliciously libelous statements-while at the same time
not weakening the capacity for wide-ranging discussion of public
24
questions.
The remaining issue was whether the Times advertisement forfeited constitutional protection because certain claims made therein
were false and supposedly defamatory in nature.25 The Warren
Court answered in the negative, that "[ijnjury to official reputation affords no more warrant for repressing speech that would otherwise be free than does factual error. 21 6 Moreover, a dilution of this
constitutional right similarly is unwarranted even in a situation in
which a combination of falsity and defamation is evident in sharp
criticism of a public official.Y
22. For literature on the right of access see J. BARRON, supra note 13; Barron,
Access-The Only Choice for the Media, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 766 (1970); Barron, An Emerging
First Amendment Right of Access to the Media, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 487 (1969); Barron,
Access to the Press-A New FirstAmendment Right, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1641 (1967); Daniel,
Right of Access to Mass Media-Government Obligation to Enforce First Amendment? 48
TExAs L. REV. 783 (1970).
23. 376 U.S. at 270. Justice Brennan later explained why the Alabama rule specifically
"dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate." See id. at 279. He never explained, however, the factual foundation, if any, behind the assertion that the Court's ruling
in Times would specifically promote "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" public debate over
important policy issues. Apparently this is another example of what Professors Miller and
Barron label "untested and unproven" assumptions. Miller & Barron, supra note 9, at 1231.
24. Compare Justice Brennan's statement in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966):
Society has a pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon
reputation. But in cases like the present, there is tension between this interest and the
values nurtured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The thrust of New York
Times is that when interests in public discussion are particularly strong, as they were
in that case, the Constitution limits the protections afforded by the law of defamation.
25. 376 U.S. at 271.
26. Id. at 272.
27. Id. at 273. Going outside the formal flow of information to the Court, Justice Brennan interpreted the first amendment's historical meaning and explained how this new standard related to a chief lesson learned from the constitutional debate surrounding enforcement
of the Sedition Act of 1798. 1 Stat. 596. Brennan observed: "Although the Sedition Act was
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Award of general damages to Sullivan by the Alabama courts
was thus reversed because actual malice by the Times was not reflected in the published criticism of Sullivan's performance.28 Under
the Alabama ruling, potential critics would be forced into a position
of self-censorship-whether or not their beliefs were correctbecause they would have to prove such accusations in court, or
because they would incur large expenses in doing so. 21 Hence, in the
oft-quoted words of the Court:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits
a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating
to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with
"actual malice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.30

The Court thus not only rejected Sullivan's assertion that the Times
advertisement criticized his performance as police 3commissioner,
but also promulgated broad new guidelines for libel. 1
Despite the so-called strict constructionist, conservative legal
philosophies of the four Nixon appointees,32 the Burger Court in Roe
v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton displayed a capacity to legislate broad
social policy in a fashion strikingly similar to that manifest in the
Times decision of the Warren Court.3 Texas statutory provisions
never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of
history." Id. at 276. This led Professor Kalven to remark that "[t]his is heady doctrine. The
Court has never before been quite so candid about its use of history." Kalven, supra note 12,
at 193.
28. Weighing the standard established in Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229
(1963), Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), and Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946), the Court decided in Times that:
[Tihe proof presented to show actual malice lacks the convincing clarity which the
constitutional standard demands, and hence that it would not constitutionally sustain
the judgment for respondent under the proper rule of law ....
... The statement by the Times' Secretary that, apart from the padlocking allegation,
he thought the advertisement was "substantially correct," affords no constitutional
warrant for the Alabama Supreme Court's conclusion that it was a "cavalier ignoring of
the falsity of the advertisement [from which] the jury could not have but been impressed with the bad faith of The Times, and its maliciousness inferable therefrom."
376 U.S. at 285-86.
29. Id. at 279.
30. Id. at 279-80.
31. Id. at 288-92.
32. See Nixon's separate descriptions of Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon 1969,
at 392, 396 (1971); 7 WKLY. COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 1431-32 (1971); 6 WKLY. COMP. OF Pas.
Docs. 523 (1970); N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1971, § 1, at 24, col. 2-3; Wash. Post, Oct. 22, 1971, §
1, at 1, col. 7; N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1968, § 1, at 79, col. 3-4; Wash. Post, May 9, 1968, § 1, at
1, col. 4.
33. Unlike the ruling in Times, the Court was unable to decide these cases unanimously. Justice Blackmun spoke for the seven-member majority in both cases, but White and
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pertaining to abortion challenged in Roe were essentially like those
operative in most other states at that time, making it a crime to
procure or attempt an abortion unless, based upon a physician's
advice, it would save the mother's life.3 4 An unmarried, pregnant
35
resident of Dallas County, known by the pseudonym Jane Roe,
initiated a federal class action suit in March, 1970, seeking a declaRehnquist dissented with opinions in each case, criticizing their colleagues for making sweeping new policies. Burger and Douglas also wrote concurring opinions in both cases. Justice
Stewart submitted a concurring statement in Roe, while joining Blackmun's majority opinion
in Doe. For literature analyzing Roe, Doe, and related matters see, e.g., Ely, The Wages of
Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Epstein, Substantive Due
Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159; Heymann &
Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics,53 B.U.L. REV. 765 (1973);
O'Meara, Abortion: The Court Decides a Non-Case, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 337; Sherain, Beyond
Roe and Doe: The Rights of the Father, 50 NOTRE DAME LAw. 483 (1975); Tribe, Foreword:

Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973); 74
COLUM. L. REV. 237 (1974); 61 GEo. L.J. 1559 (1973); 87 HARV. L. REV. 75 (1973); 51 N.C.L.
REV. 1573 (1973); 47 TE(PLE L.Q. 715 (1974); 26 VAnD. L. REV. 823 (1973); 60 VA. L. REV. 305
(1974).
34. TEXAs PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 15, ch. 9, arts. 1191-94, 1196 (1961), provided for the
following:
Article 1191. Abortion
If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman or knowingly procure
to be administered with her consent any drug or medicine, or shall use towards her any
violence or means whatever externally or internally applied, and thereby procure an
abortion, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five
years; if it be done without her consent, the punishment shall be doubled. By "abortion"
is meant that the life of the fetus or embryo shall be destroyed in the woman's womb or
that a premature birth thereof be caused.
Art. 1192. Furnishing the means
Whoever furnishes the means for procuring an abortion knowing the purpose intended is guilty as an accomplice.
Art. 1193. Attempt at abortion
If the means used shall fail to produce an abortion, the offender is nevertheless
guilty of an attempt to produce abortion, provided it be shown that such means were
calculated to produce that result, and shall be fined not less than one hundred nor more
than one thousand dollars.
Art. 1194. Murder in producing abortion
If the death of the mother is occasioned by an abortion so produced or by an attempt
to effect the same it is murder.
Art. 1196. By medical advice
Nothing in this chapter applies to an abortion procured or attempted by medical
advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.
35. Justice Blackmun's opinion assumed the reliability of available information concerning Ms. Roe's personal situation:
Despite the use of the pseudonym, no suggestion is made that Roe is a fictitious
person. For purposes of her case, we accept as true, and established, her existence; her
pregnant state, as of the inception of her suit in March 1970 and as late as May 21 of
that year when she filed an alias affidavit with the District Court; and her inability to
obtain a legal abortion in Texas.
410 U.S. at 124.
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ratory judgment to the effect that these provisions were unconstitutionally broad infringements of privacy, and requesting an order
enjoining the Dallas County district attorney from their enforcement. 6
The federal district court concluded that the ninth (through the
fourteenth) amendment of the Constitution bestowed a "fundamental right of single women and married persons to choose whether to
have children" 37 and that the abortion statutes of Texas were unreasonably vague and violative of individual rights under the ninth
amendment. The three-judge district panel, however, refused to
grant Roe the declaratory and injunctive relief which she sought,
38
causing her to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Constitutionally, the most important claim by petitioner on appeal
was that a woman has an absolute right to an abortion-at any
time, regardless of the reason, and in whatever way she chooses. The
counterclaim of the respondent was that recognition and protection
of prenatal life constitutes a "compelling state interest" 39 which can
therefore be regulated.
Mr. Justice Blackmun's now famous opinion, speaking for six
of his brethren, "demonstrated anew the Court's ability to make
daring innovations in constitutional law."40 It first held that Roe
involved a case or controversy to which the Court's jurisdiction extended, and that the appellant had standing to appeal the case.
Specifically, the Justices found exception with "[t]he usual rule in
federal cases that an actual controversy must exist at stages of
appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date the action
was initiated." 4 ' The majority rejected the old rule because "the
normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate process is complete. ' 42 Essentially, Justice Blackmun declared that the biological
characteristics and time frame involved in human pregnancy pre36. Roe's case was consolidated by the three-judge district court with two related actions, one taken by a licensed practicing physician, the other by a childless married couple.
See id. at 120-22.
37. Id. at 122, quoting the district court decision.
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970). See also Justice Blackmun's comments, 410 U.S. at
123.
39. See 410 U.S. at 153-56.
40. Epstein, supra note 33, at 159. For a harsher assessment of the Court's policymaking in the Abortion Cases see Ely, supra note 33, at 928, 935-37, quoted at infra note 49.
41. 410 U.S. at 125. That Roe was in fact pregnant when her suit was originally filed
seems to have been assumed by the Justices.
42. Id.
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sented a "classic justification"4 3 for bypassing this customary standard for mootness-and for establishing a quite different criterion. 4
Justice Blackmun next addressed the central question of a
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy if she so chooses. To
answer this question he delved substantially into information concerning the historical, social, and legal background of abortion,
explaining that related state criminal laws in effect throughout most
of the United States had their origins in statutory law of the last half
of the nineteenth century.45 Prior to that time American statutes
regulating termination of pregnancies during the early time frame
were considerably more liberal, giving greater discretion to the
woman with respect to the abortion option, but over the years antiabortion attitudes had become increasingly reflected in state law.4 6
Justice Blackmun reasoned that the guarantee of privacy, while
not specifically mentioned by the Constitution, included "fundamental" personal rights or those "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."4 As such, privacy rights have received Supreme Court
recognition in regard to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education." Influenced by
medical and social-as opposed to strictly legal-information, the
Court declared that, based on its broad interpretation of the due
process clause, this privacy doctrine was to be extended to cover a
woman's decision to have an abortion:
This right of privacy ... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the State
43. Id.
44. For discussion and critique see Epstein, supra note 33, at 160-67.
45. See 410 U.S. at 129-47. This survey of the history of abortion and related law
included ancient attitudes toward abortion; the Hippocratic Oath; the common law; English
statutory law; American law; and the positions of the American Medical Association, the
American Public Health Association, and the American Bar Association. See id. at 130-47.
It is unclear, however, how this survey relates to the essence of the Roe ruling "for at no point
[does it] lend support for the ultimate decision to divide pregnancy into three parts, each
subject to its own constitutional rules." Epstein, supra note 33, at 167.
46. Blackmun's reading of medical and legal history revealed that these laws had been
attributed to or justified by three factors: that they discouraged illicit sexual behavior (an
argument not relied upon by Texas); that they protected the life of the pregnant woman
(particularly since antiseptic techniques were not widely utilized during the nineteenth
century); and that they guarded prenatal life (a premise often strongly opposed by those
challenging criminal abortion statutes). See 410 U.S. at 147-52.
47. Id. at 152, quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
48. See 410 U.S. at 152-53. See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is
apparent."

This "fundamental" right is not absolute, however. Under the
policy formulation in Roe, a woman is not guaranteed an abortion
"at whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she
alone chooses."5 Where the state has a "compelling interest," it
retains the power to regulate abortions so as to protect health, medical standards, and prenatal life.' The Court therefore concluded,
"that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision,
but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against
important state interests in regulation.

'5

In defining the troublesome concepts arising from this point,
the Burger Court deeply entered the policy-making arena, enunciating new rules applicable to extremely controversial, value-laden,
and sensitive subjects. 3 First, the Court held that the reference to
"person" in the fourteenth amendment does not extend to an unborn child, contrary to the appellee's contentions and to the beliefs
of many religious groups. 4 Secondly, the majority dodged the age49. 410 U.S. at 153. Note, however, that "Roe suggests an inference ... neither...
from the intent of the framers, or from the governmental system contemplated by the Constitution-in support of the constitutional right to an abortion." Ely, supra note 33, at 928. Or
put more strongly:
What is frightening about Roe is that this super-protected right is not inferable from the
language of the Constitution, the framers' thinking respecting the specific problem in
issue . . . or the nation's governmental structure. Nor is it explainable in terms of the
unusual political impotence of the group judicially protected vis-a-vis the interest that
legislatively prevailed over it. [citation omitted] And that, I believe . . . is a charge
that can responsibly be leveled at no other decision of the past twenty years. At times
the inferences the Court has drawn from the values the Constitution marks for special
protection have been controversial, even shaky, but never before has its sense of an
obligation to draw one been so obviously lacking.
Id. at 935-37. Professor Ely qualifies this last sentence, however, arguing that Roe involves
policy-making comparable to that 68 years earlier in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
See Ely, supra note 33, at 937-43. See also Tribe, supra note 33, at 5-15; Miller & Barron,
supra note 9, at 54-56. Compare 61 GEO. L.J. 1559 (1973).
50. 410 U.S. at 153.
51. Id. at 154.
52. Id.
53. As Justice Blackmun observed:
We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of the
abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and of the
deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One's philosophy,
one's experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one's religious
training, one's attitudes toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards
one establishes and seeks to observe, all are likely to influence and to color one's thinking
and conclusions about abortion.
Id. at 116.
54. See id. at 158.
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old query of when life in fact begins,55 but ruled nevertheless that
the broadly stated Texas statutory provision abridged the rights of
pregnant women who were only able to secure a legal abortion when
their lives actually were endangered." Thirdly, and most importantly, the Court fashioned a controversial standard for conditions
under which a state may or may not regulate abortions to protect a
woman's health and "potential life." In a carefully worded policy
57
proclamation that swept aside the abortion laws of most, if not all,
states and created the legal concept of three trimesters of pregnancy, Justice Blackmun announced that the state has a "compelling interest" at
...

approximately the end of the first trimester. This is so because of the now-

established medical fact,

. . . that

until the end of the first trimester mortality

in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth. It follows that,
from and after this point, a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the
extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection
of maternal health....
This means, on the other hand, that, for the period of pregnancy prior to
this "compelling" point, the attending physician, in consultation with his
patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his
medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State.
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential
life, the "compelling" point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then
presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb.
State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and
biological justifications. If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after
viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period,
except
58
when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.

Briefly stated, during the first trimester of pregnancy the abortion decision is totally in the hands of the woman and her physician;
during the second trimester the state may regulate abortion procedures in the interest of maternal health; and during the third
trimester the state's "compelling interest" is so strong (because the
fetus is then viable) that it may prohibit an abortion (unless necessary to protect the woman's health or life)." Because such fine distinctions necessarily were absent from the Texas statute-since Justice Blackmun had just declared them to be the law of the land-the
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 159.
Id. at 162, 164.
See Tribe, supra note 33, at 2.
410 U.S. at 163-64. See Ely, supra note 33, at 924-26 for an effective critique of the

Court's "viability" and "compelling state interest" doctrines. See also Tribe, supra note 33,
at 4, 27-8.
59. See Justice Blackmun's summary, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
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state's abortion law was ruled unconstitutional under the fourteenth
amendment's due process requirements.
The companion case of Doe v. Bolton"0 involved a 1968 Georgia
criminal abortion statute," more liberal and specific than those in
most states, fashioned after the Model Penal Code of the American
Law Institute.2 Georgia's provisions established abortion as a crime
punishable by one to ten years imprisonment, except that a licensed
physician could abort when his "best clinical judgment" suggested
that a pregnancy (1) would endanger the woman's life or impair her
health "seriously and permanently," (2) would result in the birth
of a child with "a grave, permanent, and irremediable mental or
3
physical defect," or (3) was caused by forcible or statutory rape.
Apart from these requirements, such a physician-approved
abortion was deemed noncriminal only when a number of additional
criteria were met. These included the requirement that the woman
be a Georgia resident; that the "physician's judgment is reduced to
writing and concurred in by at least two other physicians duly licensed to practice medicine and surgery.

. .

who certify in writing

that based upon their separate personal medical examinations of
the pregnant woman, the abortion is, in their judgment, necessary
because of one or more of the reasons enumerated above"; 4 that the
abortion be conducted in a hospital licensed by the State Board of
Health and holding accreditation from the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals; that the attending physician receive
advance approval from the hospital's abortion committee; and that
certifications be forthcoming of any rape said to have occurred.65
Differing greatly from the Texas statute, the Georgia law nevertheless established a wide range of procedures and standards that had
the cumulative effect of discouraging women from seriously considering and pursuing the abortion option.
Against this background a married, pregnant, indigent
woman-identified as Mary Doe-challenged the Georgia law in
federal court in April 1970.11 As in Roe, the plaintiff requested a
60. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
61. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1201 to -1203 (1968), reprinted in 410 U.S. at 202-05.
62. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), reprinted in 410 U.S. at
205-07. At the time of the Doe decision, the ALI proposal was operative in roughly a dozen
states. 410 U.S. at 182.
63. 410 U.S. at 183.
64. Id. at 203.
65. For details concerning all of the above requirements see id. at 202-05.
66. Her suit was joined by 23 other persons and two nonprofit Georgia corporations. For
district and Supreme Court decisions regarding the claims of these other plaintiffs see id. at
186, 188-89.
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declaratory judgment that the abortion provisions were unconstitutionally restrictive and sought an injunction prohibiting enforcement. Doe claimed an abortion was necessary in her case for financial and physical reasons: she was financially unable to support a
child and, in any event, had been informed by a physician that an
abortion would be less dangerous to her health than giving birth to
the child.17 During the eighth week of pregnancy, however, her application to the abortion committee of an Atlanta hospital was denied because state guidelines failed to provide for abortions for charity patients.6 8 This meant, Doe insisted, that her only alternatives
were to bear the child or to break the law by seeking an illegal
abortion. Her class action suit claimed that this situation abridged
her rights guaranteed under the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments, and that the Georgia statute was unconstitutionally vague. The district court ruled that Doe's rights of privacy
and "personal liberty" were denied because the Georgia statute
specified merely three circumstances under which an abortion could
be approved.69 On the other hand, upholding the remainder of the
statute and denying injunctive relief, the court observed that the
state possessed the power to regulate "the manner of performance
as well as the quality of the final decision to abort" so as to protect
the woman's health and the "potential of independent human existence. ' 70 As in Roe, plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court for
further relief and also pursued her attack on portions of the Georgia
statute upheld by the lower court.
Unlike Roe, the Doe case chiefly concerned the constitutional
acceptability of narrowly written statutory provisions regulating
standards and procedures for abortions. Applying and extending the
activist policy announced in Roe, Justice Blackmun's majority
opinion addressed Doe's contentions: "undue restriction of a right
to personal and marital privacy; vagueness; deprivation of substantive and procedural due process; improper restriction to Georgia
residents; and denial of equal protection." 7 1 For the threshold issue
Justice Blackmun referred to the holding in Roe, decided on the
same day, that abortion statutes containing provisions regulating
the decision whether to abort during the first trimester of pregnancy
amounted to an unconstitutional infringement of a woman's pri67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 185.
Id., n.7.
Id. at 186. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
Id. at 187, quoting Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1055, 1056 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
Id. at 189.
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vacy.72 On the vagueness issue the Court rejected the view that

physicians would be less inclined to approve abortions because the
Georgia statute required that an abortion be "necessary. 7

3 Further,

Justice Blackmun explained that accreditation by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals was not required for a facility
to meet adequate standards to perform abortions, and "that the
hospital requirement of the Georgia law, because it fails to exclude
the first trimester of pregnancy [under Roe], is also invalid."74
On a related but more noteworthy procedural due process issue,
the Justices held "that the interposition of the hospital abortion
committee [to approve an abortion] is unduly restrictive of the
patient's rights and needs that, at this point, have already been
medically delineated and substantiated by her personal physician."7 5 The last due process question similarly was answered in
favor of the appellant, striking down the requirement that an abortion must be approved by two additional licensed Georgia physicians.7 Georgia's residency requirement also was deemed unconstitutional under the privileges and immunities clause, 77 for it denied
medical services to non-Georgia residents entering the state to seek
abortions. 7 Finally, the Court decided that since the accreditation,

approval, and confirmation stipulations of the Georgia abortion
statutes had been declared unconstitutional, it was no longer necessary to answer the question whether the Georgia procedure denied
equal protection of the laws by discriminating against the poor. 79 On
the whole, then, as in Times and Roe, the Justices legislated policies
that overruled actions of state legislatures and that, further, revolutionized the Supreme Court's own prior doctrinal trends.
I.

THE "PRELIMINARY INQUIRY" OF PROFESSORS MILLER AND BARRON

For nearly twenty years Arthur S. Miller has been a crusader
seeking to dispel lingering myths and erroneous interpretations con72. Id. at 189-91. See notes 47-52 and accompanying text supra.
73. Id. at 191-92. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971), suggested the answer to
the question, according to the majority opinion. There the Court ruled that "whether a
particular operation is necessary for a patient's physical or mental health is a judgment that
physicians are obviously called upon to make routinely whenever surgery is considered." Id.
at 72. Thus, in Doe, Blackmun wrote that "[t]his conclusion is equally applicable here.
Whether, in the words of the Georgia statute, 'an abortion is necessary' is a professional
judgment that the Georgia physician will be called upon to make routinely." 410 U.S. at 192.
74. 410 U.S. at 194-95.
75. Id. at 198.
76. Id. at 199.
77. U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 2.
78. 410 U.S. at 200.
79. Id. at 200-01.
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cerning the role, functioning, and impact of the United States Supreme Court. A similar theme emerges from his collaboration with
another provocative scholar, Jerome A. Barron, in their critical, yet
constructive, article The Supreme Court, the Adversary System,
and the Flow of Information to the Justices:A PreliminaryInquiry."
The authors periodically explain that they are attempting to lay to
rest persistent mythology which, in fact, the "sophisticated members of the bar and of the general public have long seen through
.... ,"11 Their analysis of Supreme Court information flow and
policy promulgation, however, extends well beyond this objective.
Through their examination of Times and the Abortion Cases,
Professors Miller and Barron demonstrate that the process of informing the judicial mind in prominent constitutional cases is far
more complicated than is suggested by the traditional conception
of the adversary system. The "orthodox model,"8" which they interpret for the most part as corresponding to the Blackstonian view,3
is simply that "an appellate judge refers to briefs and records, to
asked during oral argument, and to
answers gleaned from questions
'strict' judicial notice."8" During the procedure of finding and applying legal standards, virtually no room exists for "creativity" or judicially made law." This, Miller and Barron say, is sheer fantasy.
A.

OperationalPremises

Customarily accepted operational premises underlying the adversary process at the Supreme Court level are crucial to an understanding of the Miller-Barron article, which painstakingly documents the fact that several of these premises are inapplicable to the
selected cases." One elementary assumption is that a "case or controversy" must be involved before the Supreme Court will accept an
issue for decision, and that therefore the Court does not act as a
"self-starter." Indeed, "the threshold requirement of the existence
of a 'case' or 'controversy' is basic to the assumption of authority
by all United States courts."" It follows that the Justices have no
80.
81.
82.

Miller & Barron, supra note 9.
See id. at 1187-90.
Id. at 1187-89.

83. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTAMES,

discussed at infra note 180. For a defense of

the Blackstone view see Mishkin, The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of
Time and Law,79 HARv. L. REv. 56, 62-70 (1965).
84. Miller & Barron 1187.

85. Id.
86. These assumptions or premises are generally discussed at id., 1187-93. Ten are
enumerated at id., 1188-89.
87. Frankfurter & Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at OctoberTerm, 1934, 49
HARv. L. Rav. 68, 94 (1935).
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power to rule on hypothetical questions and that they will consistently refuse to issue advisory opinions.88 They instead decide only
narrow legal issues based on the specific record from a lower court,
closely following precedent and refusing to legislate broad new social
89
policy.
Another operational presumption is that the United States
Supreme Court relies completely on the lower court as a fact-finder
and on counsel to present the adjudicative facts of a case, pertinent
authoritative law, and the legal questions at issue. The Court, at
least in theory, cannot perform these functions; it must utilize judicial notice sparingly, and "has no machinery for discovering, without the aid of the parties, matters of fact which are disputable and
disputed."9 Logically, this means that the adversary system will
produce the most relevant information pertaining to a case because
it "places the burden on the parties and competitive relationship
motivates each to find all the law and facts."" Therefore, as a case
proceeds through the judicial system and ultimately reaches the
Supreme Court, traditional thought holds that adequate and reliable data will have been brought to light. Frankfurter and Hart have
explained this point in the following manner:
The Court's sense of its position and function as an appellate tribunal
leads it to emphasize not only the necessity of adequate data but of data
already explored and sifted by trial and intermediate tribunals. This insistence
rests not merely upon administrative consideration of the pressure of business.
It rests also upon awareness of adjudication as a process, as a process in which
the deliberation of successive tribunals serve to illuminate final judgment and
in which particularly "the special knowledge of local conditions" possessed by
local tribunals may be indispensable."

The Court's functioning is further assumed to be rational in
88. See Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REv. 1002 (1924).
89. See, e.g., Arnold, Trial by Combat and the New Deal, 47 HARV. L. REV. 913 (1934).
90. Morgan, JudicialNotice, 57 HARv. L. REv. 269 (1944). Thus, according to conventional thought, "it cannot be questioned that in the United States the primary responsibility
and control over almost all phases of the judicial process continue to reside in the parties."
J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL, & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (1968).
More to the point, Professor Reich has written: "Courts have no sources of information other
than the records before them, and judges have no special knowledge to assist them in evaluating information of a social and political nature if they were able to obtain it." Reich, Mr.
Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARv. L. REv. 673, 740 (1963).
91. W. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 5 (1968). Stated differently, "it is the lawyer's duty to call the court's attention to authorities that it might otherwise overlook." C. AUERBACH, L. GARRISON, W. HURST, & S. MERMIN, THE LEGAL PROCESS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO DECISION-MAKING BY JUDICIAL, LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES 193 (1961).

92. Frankfurter & Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1934, 49
HARv. L. REV. 68, 96 (1935).
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nature."3 This idea in turn is based upon the theoretical competence
of lawyers and Justices participating in the decisional process.
Counsel who argue cases before the Court are thought to be capable
of handling a wide range of subjects-legal, social, or technical in
nature-with approximately the same competence. 4 The Justices
also are thought to be capable of dealing with the myriad of complex
questions argued before them. 5 Moreover, the supposition is that
"[tihe defects, if any, of a trial judge may be cured or corrected
by the judge of the appellate courts; those of the judges of the court
of last resort must be assumed not to exist."9
Equally as important, the adversary system supposedly minimizes the possibility that the Justices will reach a premature decision based upon their initial understanding of the case and the
applicable law, or upon their own personal points of view. The orthodox model thus essentially adheres to the philosophy that members of the Supreme Court "act as justice blindfolded, with strict
impartiality and without personal preferences or predilections affecting their decisions." 7 To more traditional thinkers this means
that the Justices decide according to "the law," suggesting that only
one legal principle is applicable to the point in question. As Miller
and Barron chide, "[t]he law, thus, is not created anew in each
constitutional decision, but pre-exists.""5 All the foregoing operational assumptions regarding the adversary process culminate in the
belief that "truth" emerges from the collision of competing ideas
and arguments in a court of law. For this reason "[tihe most important aspect of the adversary system is the claim of truth-finding
upon which it rests." 9
Most, if not all, of these assumptions periodically have been
questioned or attacked by students of the legal process. Professors
93. Morgan, supra note 90. As Lon Fuller has observed:
In the end, the justification for the adversary system lies in the fact that it is a
means by which the capacities of the individual may be lifted to the point where he gains
the power to view reality through eyes other than his own, where he is able to become
as impartial, and as free from prejudice, as the lot of humanity will admit.
Fuller, The Adversary System, 47 in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW (rev. ed. H. Berman ed. 1971).
See also Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15
(1959).
94. Miller & Barron, supra note 9, at 1188.
95. Id. But see Reich, quoted at note 90 supra.
96. Morgan, supra note 90, at 270.
97. Miller & Barron 1188.
98. Id. at 1189.
99. J. SIGLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM 121 (1968). Or in the words of two
political scientists, "The theory is that if each side follows this self-serving strategy [in an
adversary proceeding], the truth will emerge." W. MURPHY & C. PRITCHEr, COURTS, JUDGES,
AND POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 317 (1961).
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Miller and Barron suggest, however, that the Blackstone model retains some viability.' °° Through an analysis of three major constitutional decisions, they proceed to report evidence that contradicts
the traditional conception of decision-making by and information
flow to the Supreme Court. Their efforts provide considerable support for six propositions regarding information flow, each of which
is utilized in this article for constructing models of the Court's informing process.
B. PropositionsRegarding Information Flow
(1) Proposition Number One
First among these propositions is that in constitutional cases
"[t]he Supreme Court tends to ignore narrow 'adjudicative' facts
and to focus on larger, more general problems." ' ' After carefully
analyzing information inputs in Roe and Doe-records, briefs, and
oral arguments-and comparing them to the Court's final decisions,
Miller and Barron conclude that Justice Blackmun clearly was seeking to establish a broad new judicial policy. 102 In so doing, the Court
deliberately chose to address these cases on general grounds of the
constitutionality of state statutes regulating the availability of legalized abortions, rather than on the narrow issue of the district
courts' decisions to deny injunctive relief.0 3 Justice Blackmun's
principal emphasis was neither on the narrow facts in the Abortion
Cases, nor on those particular litigants, nor on the cases as class
actions. Instead, and contrary to the view expressed in the Georgia
brief,u4 the majority essentially issued an advisory opinion "by
100. Miller & Barron 1188-90. The authors believe their conclusion applies not only to
traditional or conservative jurists and attorneys, but also to their academic colleagues in law
and political science, although all groups know in fact that the Blackstone model falls short
of reality.
101. Miller & Barron 1193. In some litigation at the Supreme Court level, this tendency
seems in part to explain the "appellate transformation of cases" from relatively routine
questions in lower courts to ones of major constitutional significance at the apex of the judicial
hierarcy. See R. RIcHARDSoN & K. VINES, THE PoLrncs OF FEDERAL COURTS: LOWER COURTS IN
THE UNITED STATES 127-29 (1970). The proposition was also given support at the time of Mr.
Justice Douglas' resignation from the Court when one of his law clerks noted "how Douglas
would go through a draft opinion and take out specific facts and legal points quite deliberately
in hopes that the opinion would be interpreted broadly and lead to further change in the law."
MacKenzie, The Defender of Dissent, Wash. Post, Nov. 16, 1975, § 1, at 3, col. 2.
102. Miller & Barron 1193. Indeed, the Court "treated the cases as open invitations to
write broad, 'advisory' opinions setting forth a legislative prescription to cover not only the
particular litigants. . . but all women who become pregnant." Id. Compare this assessment
to those cited at notes 40, 49, & 73 supra.
103. Miller & Barron 1193. See also notes 38, 70 and accompanying text supra.
104. See the selections from the Georgia brief cited in Miller & Barron 1195-96.
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going far beyond the facts of a case to attempt to settle cases not
'0 5
then before the Court."'
In broadly ruling that during the first trimester of pregnancy a
woman and her physician should have complete control over the
basic decision with regard to an abortion, Justice Blackmun was
delegating governmental power to that woman and doctor, while
simultaneously ignoring highly pertinent, narrow adjudicative facts
relating to the particular appellant.' 5 Related delegations of power
were made by the Court to the states concerning the second and
third trimesters of pregnancy, but again based upon the general
problem emerging in the minds of the Justices, as opposed to the
narrow adjudicative facts specifically presented in records, briefs,
and oral arguments.10 7
According to Professors Miller and Barron, New York Times v.
Sullivan is a similar illustration of Supreme Court policy-making
105. Id. at 1193. More specifically:
The Abortion Cases were appeals from three-judge courts; but those appeals could easily
have been dismissed because of mootness or other grounds of nonjusticiability. It is
obvious that the Court wanted to rule on abortion, and further, to rule broadly, and that
it found in Ms. Roe and Ms. Doe two parties who, although they had won declaratory
relief in the lower courts, nonetheless were permitted to appeal because they did not get
everything they had asked for. That they didn't get that specific relief from the Supreme
Court either is wryly amusing-but they did obtain a sweeping advisory opinion.
Id. at 1197. The authors explain that the Supreme Court, in fact, has discretionary power to
issue advisory opinions, and that the exercise of that power is "neither novel nor frequent."
Id. at 1193.
106. Nowhere in the Court's opinion is there an indication of how long Ms. Roe
had been pregnant; it accepted "as true" both that she existed and was pregnant when
the suit was brought to test the Texas anti-abortion statute, and that she was unmarried
and unable lawfully to secure an abortion. According to the Texas brief, "[n]either the
Appellants nor the Appellee offered any evidence" at the hearing before a three-judge
federal court convened to adjudge the constitutionality of the Texas statute. [citation
omitted]...
The conclusion is inescapable: Narrow "adjudicative" facts in the Roe case were not
considered important insofar as they dealt with the status of the person seeking to
invalidate the Texas law. The Court went even further: It slid over an argument of
mootness, because "our law should not be . . . [so] rigid" as to proscribe adjudication
because of the normal 266-day human gestation period. [citation omitted] Ms. Roe, in
other words, was important to the trimester decision only because a pregnant woman
was necessary to bring the action; once brought, the details of her condition became
irrelevant.
Id. at 25, citing the Brief for Appellee, Roe v. Wade, at 4, and 410 U.S. at 125.
107. Medical history was not cited by Justice Blackmun in Doe:
Contrary to Roe, the Court in Doe was content merely to cite no history or other
"authority"; it did not set forth precisely why the Georgia statutory provisions were
invalid. We are left to assume that the "compelling interest"/due process rationale in
Roe covers the different situations in Doe. As Justice Rehnquist asserted in his dissenting opinion, the Court used equal protection analysis to cover a due process decision-something new under the Constitutional sun.
Id. at 1196.
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that rests upon judicial premises extending considerably beyond the
adjudicative facts of the case to a more general policy question. In
preparing to argue the appeal for the New York Times, "Professor
Herbert Wechsler, like a careful advocate, wrote his brief . . . to
allow the Supreme Court to hold simply that the first amendment
does not permit a conclusion that libel per se has occurred when the
plaintiff, a government official, has not been named and there was
no intent to injure him." ' But, to the surprise of the litigants, the
Court avoided a decision on this relatively limited ground, and it
neglected to emphasize-for purposes of policy-the narrow fact
that Sullivan was not named in the Times advertisement. Expanding upon views mentioned but not accentuated in petitioner's and
amici briefs,0 9 the Court instead extended its ruling to defamation
of all public officials, regardless of whether they were named or
unnamed in a media account. Therefore, contrary to traditional
conceptions of Supreme Court policy-making and information flow,
Miller and Barron determine that "the statement of law and policy
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan was far broader than the facts
of the case required.""' Indeed, they argue, the Court in Times and
Roe actually "(a) ignored adjudicative facts; (b) was not interested
in the litigants qua litigants, but only as a means to an end; (c)
stated a general, as distinguished from a specific, norm; and (d)
thus became in fact a 'self-starter.' """ Clearly, at this early stage
in their article, the Miller-Barron attack on the traditional model
of judicial information flow and decision-making is solidly
launched.
(2)

Proposition Number Two

As suggested by the first proposition, the second asserts that
"[t]he bar treats the Court much like a legislative committee. A
variety of major premises are offered on the basis of their virtue as
policy rather than of their authoritative character as law." 2 Put in
108. Id. at 1197.
109. "The Times did not seek the extension of first amendment protection against libel
to all elected public officials, whether named or unnamed. But the brief did introduce the
powerful idea that allowing Sullivan to recover would in fact revive the law of seditious libel,
in a manner sufficient to cause the Court to give wider protection than the Times sought."
Id. at 1198.
110. Id. at 1197. See id. at 1199-1208 for the second proposition advanced by Miller and
Barron, which also relates to this conclusion.
111. Id. at 1199.
112. Id. The value of this portion of the Miller and Barron study was suggested in a
remark ventured by Professor Kalven over a decade ago in connection with Times:
A careful comparison of the brief and the opinion of the Court would itself be a
profitable enterprise. At various critical points, the opinion echoes the carefully precise

19761

JUDICIAL POLICY-MAKING

different terms, in seminal constitutional cases counsel stress farreaching and largely unsubstantiated "legislative facts" furnishing
the foundation for alternative judicial policies,"' rather than stressing the rule of law or narrow "adjudicative facts" derived from the
individual case under consideration. The Justices even occasionally
encourage or guide counsel's presentation of alternative policies
during oral argument, as if they were legislators conducting congressional hearings. From these policy alternatives the Justices may
then choose the one most consistent with their own conceptions of
what the Constitution requires, conditioned by the preferences of
other Court members and any judicial bargaining that occurs prior
to the final decision's announcement.
Both in briefs and in oral argument, counsel for the plaintiff in
Roe displayed a keen understanding of the policy-making options
open to the Court and, in fact, how the Court at times legislates in
landmark constitutional cases. A thorough reading of briefs and
arguments thus leads Professors Miller and Barron to view Roe's
counsel as "really lobbying the Court.""' For example, counsels'
brief provided a comprehensive appendix that reproduced a large
body of related social, legal, and medical publications, a table depicting the types of statutory provisions regulating abortions
throughout the nation, professional groups' proposals, state and
federal judicial rulings pertaining to abortions, and instances where
medical and social science data have received judicial notice."'
Much data concerned broad legislative, not narrow adjudicative,
facts."' Additionally, Roe's attorneys candidly observed that regulation of abortion is particularly susceptible to predisposition, and
openly encouraged the Supreme Court to take judicial notice of
language of the brief and the structure of the Court's argument reflects the structure of
argument in the brief.
Kalven, supra note 12, at 192 n.6. See also S. KmsLov, supra note 13, at 63.
113. For literature relating to "legislative facts" see, e.g., K. DAvis, ADmiNsTRATvE LAW
TREATISE ch. 15 (1958); Alfange, The Relevance of Legislative Facts in Constitutional

Litigation, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 637 (1966); Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional
Litigation, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 75.
114. Miller & Barron, supra note 9, at 1202. See also id. at 1204, where assertions of an
amicus brief take on the appearance of a "pressure group activity." While Roe's counsel
exhibited a great deal of sophistication in approaching the Justices, such is not always true.
Indeed, in Roe, as in many other cases, the competence of counsel varies in large measure.
Id. at 1199. That there is significant variance in counsels' abilities and sophistication in the
way they present their arguments has been evident in such landmark cases as Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Nevertheless, say
Miller and Barron, "the pretense is otherwise: the operational assumption of the adversary
system presumably is that lawyers are of roughly equal competence." Miller & Barron 1199.
115. Id. at 1200-01, quoting Brief for Appellants, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
116. See id. at 1201-04.
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relevant data provided in the brief. 7 Consistent with the traditional
conception of the adversary process,"' counsel asserted that these
data had "been carefully sifted in order to present the most directly
relevant materials. It is the hope of the parties that these materials
will be of use to the Court in reaching an informed and just decision.""9

To Miller and Barron, the notion that introduction of these
data would contribute to a just decision can only be predicated on
the view that "the attorneys [were] . . . [c]ognizant of other
times when the Court judicially noticed extra-record facts. . . rele-

vant only to the larger, more general questions of the case."' 2 The
invitation to the Court to take judicial notice of information in the
briefs appendix underscores, they say, the idea that Roe's counsel
were aware of other instances in which the Court recognized facts
outside the record. 2' Further, it is instructive that counsel presented
to the Court a large volume of information that was pertinent not
117. Id. Of course Justice Blackmun was well aware of the fact that personal attitudes
affect one's views on the regulation of abortions. See Blackmun quoted at note 53 supra.
Likewise, the Court did take broad judicial notice of certain medical and social "facts" in
Roe and Doe. This led Blackmun's "strict constructionist" colleague, Chief Justice Burger,
to remark in his concurring opinion: "I am somewhat troubled that the Court had taken
notice of various scientific and medical data in reaching its conclusion; however, I do not
believe that the Court has exceeded the scope of judicial notice accepted in other contexts."
410 U.S. at 208.
118. See Frankfurter & Hart, quoted in text accompanying note 92 supra. See also the
models discussion at notes 220-34 and accompanying text infra.
119. Miller & Barron 1200-01. The questioh arises whether the data were also "carefully
sifted" at the trial court level. They should have been, according to the orthodox model of
information flow. But witness the following remark appearing in the amicus brief presented
to the Court by two planned parenthood groups: "[We] believe that [we] can provide the
Court facts about contraceptive failure, unwanted births, and abortion which will not otherwise be presented." Quoted at id. 1202.
120. Id. at 1201. Rather than presenting narrow adjudicative facts in their amicus brief,
the National Abortion Coalition, the American Association of Planned Parenthood Physicians, and the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., introduced broad legislative
facts for the Court's consideration. See id. at 1201-03. This occurrence received the following
evaluation from Miller and Barron:
The reference to "facts" in these excerpts is obviously not to adjudicative facts as
they emerge after being introduced at trial under the rules of evidence. Rather, they are
legislative facts, often presented at a level of flat assertion unaccompanied by supporting
data.
Id. at 1203.
121. Id. at 1201. Such activities may of course be essential for wise judicial policy. See
Karst, supra note 113, who observes at 77: "[The court's legislative function requires it to
be informed on matters far beyond the facts of the particular case. These 'legislative facts'
of broader application need illumination so that the court can make the best possible prediction of the effects of its decision." Professor Alfange agrees: "[lIt is not only manifestly
feasible for the Court to examine legislative facts, but such an examination is often altogether
indispensable to sound constitutional adjudication." Alfange, supra note 113, at 678.
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to Roe specifically but to the broader issues involved.1 12 Certainly,
then, counsel behaved as if they were "before a legislative committee, . . . asking the Supreme Court to make new social policy,
rather than to rule in accordance with 'the law' . . ., [and seeking]
to influence what they admitted were 'predispositions' prevalent
about abortion." 1 3
The second hypothesis is equally substantiated by an examination of Times. The Court could have handed down at least seven
different narrow rulings applicable to libel claims.1 2 Instead, however, the Justices proclaimed a sweeping, revised doctrine of actual
malice. An explanation for this instance of judicial policy-making,
according to Professors Miller and Barron, rests upon information
exchange between Herbert Wechsler and the Justices during argument. "At oral argument Professor Wechsler apparently sensed the
Court's willingness to fashion a first amendment rule broader than
the rule he had suggested in his brief."'2 This, they argue, obviously
contradicts the assumptions of the Blackstone model regarding judicial information flow and decision-making. 2 6 Indeed, it indicates
that in the formulation of new constitutional doctrine a "tacit agreement" exists among members of the bar and the Court that a variety of policy options should be explored, resulting in "a process of
subtle and sophisticated joint policy-making . . . by counsel and
the Justices."'2 7 Unfortunately, many of the policy alternatives
122. Miller & Barron, supra note 9, at 1200-01.
123. Id. at 1201. Similar conclusions flow from an inspection of amici curiae briefs
prepared by various pro-abortion groups. See id. at 1201-04. See also the historical analysis
of the use of amici briefs in highly controversial policy issues in Krislov, The Amicus Curiae
Brief: From Friendshipto Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694 (1963).
124. Miller & Barron 1205-06. As before, these seven approaches emerge from an
examination of Wechsler's briefs and oral argument.
125. Id. at 1205. As evidence the authors refer to this interesting exchange between
Justice Goldberg and Professor Wechsler:
Mr. Justice Goldberg: Mr. Wechsler, your basic position, if I understand it correctly,
is that under the First and Fourteenth Amendments no public official can sue for libel
constitutionally and get a verdict with respect to any type of false or malicious statement
made concerning conduct, his official conduct?
Mr. Wechsler: That is the broadest statement that I make. But I wish in my remaining time to indicate what the lesser submissions are, because there are many that must
produce a reversal in this case.
Quoted at id.
126. See id. at 1207.
127. Id. at 1205. See also the discussion of policy-making by "judge and company," id.
at 1216-17.
The American Civil Liberties Union's amicus brief displays its belief that in Times the
Court could well establish an expansive new rule of libel:
In recognition of the problems raised by alleged libels about public officials, many courts
have evolved specific modifications of the general law to meet the realities of the public
official situation and to protect First Amendment rights. They have done this on a
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presented to the Justices in Times, Roe, and Doe were virtually devoid of empirical verification. This lends support to Professor Louis
H. Mayo's hypothesis "that some of the most critical Supreme
Court decisions require very little data-only a strong ethical
idea."'
(3) Proposition Number Three
Proposition number three, in large measure the most unique
thus far, follows from its predecessor: "New doctrine at times is
urged on counsel by the Court, rather than the reverse; as a result
a shift may occur from a limited position in briefs to a broad position during oral argument. ' 12 In Times, Miller and Barron point
out, Mr. Justice Stewart initially suggested during oral argument
the doctrine that ultimately was handed down by the Court."' Herbert Wechsler's original argument in fact had been considerably
more narrow, but during Justice Stewart's questioning he discerned
the hint from the bench and substantially broadened his position. 131
variety of different theories: some have defined the substantive law as calling for more
extreme accusation to justify a holding of libel per se as to a public official; some have
obliterated the extremely tenuous distinction between fact and comment and permitted
"fair comment" on public officials whether based on facts truly stated or not; some have
held the presumptions of damage and malice inoperative as to public officials; some have
in effect shifted the burden of proof to the plaintiff; and some have tended to exonerate
by a finding of "substantial truth."
Quoted at id. at 1207. This statement was framed in the political, not strictly legal, context
of the Court's policy-making responsibility to guarantee that citizens are free to "speak their
minds" regarding officials' public conduct. Id. at 1207. A similar political goal was pursued
in the Roe case, that is, to overrule the anti-abortion laws existing throughout the states. Id.
at 1199. See, e.g., the legislative facts asserted by the Planned Parenthood Federation of
America, Inc., and the American Association of Planned Parenthood Physicians, discussed
at id. 1202-03.
128. Professor Mayo is quoted at id. 1199.
129. Id. at 1208. This proposition, too, may partially explain the "appellate transformation of cases." See note 101 supra. In a related sense, it may lead to the "complaint among
lawyers . . . that they sometimes have trouble identifying the case they tried below as the
one being described in the appellate opinion." Craven, The Impact of Social Science Evidence
on the Judge: A Personal Comment,39 LAW & CoNwEMP. PROB. 150, 151 (1975).
130. Miller & Barron 1208-09. Related suggestions were made by Justice Goldberg in
Times. See id. at 1205. This conclusion was not, however, verified through examination of
the oral argument in the Abortion Cases. See id. at 1199-1203.
131. Id. at 1209. According to Miller and Barron:
When Justice Brennan asked whether there were any limits to criticism of official
conduct which would fall outside the protection of the first amendment, Wechsler replied by emphasizing the opportunity the case presented to the Court to state a new rule.
He conceded that his position in the briefs that an award of damages for defamation
concerning official conduct to a public official was equivalent to seditious libel was
legally and historically not impregnable, and that the constitutionality of the Sedition
Act of 1798 had never been specifically ruled on by the Court. But he used the ambiguity
in the law as a springboard for the formulation of new doctrine. . ..
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Once again challenging basic assumptions of the adversary process,' 2 the authors write:
The difficulty with this process is that it is too subtle ....

If the Court

wanted to establish a new first amendment privilege to protect the media
against libel suits by elected public officials, that intention should have been
communicated to the parties. The Justices should have assured that all parties
would be able to respond fully and fairly to such a novel and fundamental
issue. That, surely, would have been a more direct, even more honest, way of
proceeding. And it would have comported with the essence of the adversary
system. '

(4) Proposition Number Four
Professors Miller and Barron introduce an hypothesis central to
their theme: in the Supreme Court policy-making process "[t]he
integrity of non-legal (and other) data is frequently not subject to
test or challenge by the losing party." ' 4 Since the advent of the
Brandeis brief,'35 utilization of non-legal data frequently has characterized Supreme Court policy-making and information flow. Perhaps the most famous illustration of the use of social science data
arises in Brown v. Board of Education,'35 in which Chief Justice
Warren's majority opinion drew upon Gunnar Myrdal's analysis of
the psychological effects of segregation upon black children. 137 Consideration by the Justices of reliable and pertinent social science
data, in itself, however, does not disturb Miller and Barron.'35 They
Id. at 1209-10. See also note 27 supra.
132. See notes 89, 90, 94 and accompanying text supra.
133. Miller & Barron 1210-11.
134. Id. at 1211.
135. The Brandeis brief was first utilized in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). For
discussions of the Brandeis brief, and for the pros and cons of its usage, see generally P.
FREUND,

THE SUPREME

PERFORMANCE 150-54

COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS BUSINESS,

(1961); P. ROSEN,

PURPOSES,

THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 87-97

AND

(1972);

Levin & Moise, School Desegregation Litigation in the Seventies and the Use of Social
Science Evidence: An Annotated Guide, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 50-56 (1975).
136. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
137. Id. at 495 n.11, citing G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DIEMMA (1944).
138. As is evident from the data in Appendix A infra, there exist great differences of
opinion over this point. But many scholars and judges seem to agree with Miller and Barron.
See, e.g., Judge Craven, supra note 140, who writes at 151: "The role that the social sciences
ought to play in the judicial decision-making process is, of course, the same as the role of
any other science, whether medical, electronic, or atomic. In short, all sources of human
information and knowledge properly contribute to the determination of facts." See also P.
ROSEN, supra note 135, at 114-17; Hazard, Limitations on the Uses of BehavioralScience in
the Law, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 71 (1967); Kaplan, BehavioralScience and the Law, 19
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 57 (1967); Rosenblum, A Placefor Social Science Along the Judiciary's
ConstitutionalFrontier,66 Nw. U.L. REV. 455 (1971).
The real problem, of course, is that reliable and pertinent data were not always forthcoming or utilized in the cases examined. This provides an interesting contrast between the

Abortion Cases and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Miller & Barron, supra
note 9, at 1227-28.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:45

are concerned instead with how the Justices choose from a range of
conflicting social science findings, and they are uneasy over the fact
that such data are not always presented and debated by counsel. In
short, non-legal data that fail to emerge during adversary proceedings should not be recognized through judicial notice as supporting
a Justice's opinion announced months after formal proceedings have
concluded."'s
Yet according to the authors this is precisely what happened in
the Abortion Cases. For example, Justice Blackmun's opinions relied in part on articles written by Professor Cyril Means, who had
"a definite point of view on the abortion controversy.

. .

as a mem-

ber of Governor Rockefeller's commission appointed to review New
York's abortion laws."'4' Justice Blackmun similarly accepted as
factual-but misleadingly interpreted-a medical text's assessment
of the point at which a fetus becomes viable, a debatable issue at
best."4 Although crucial to the assumptions and standards announced in the Abortion Cases, in neither instance were these data
directly subjected to strict evaluation and refutation. The Court
based its opinion on only one school of thought.' In effect, when
139. The authors note that in some cases, e.g., Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949),
and Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 74 (1938), "the situation worsens, with the Court rendering
decisions on issues not briefed or argued by either party." Miller & Barron 1226.
140. Miller & Barron 1213. The two articles are Means, The Phoenix of Abortional
Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth Amendment Right About to Arise from the NineteenthCentury Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-CenturyCommon-Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335
(1971); Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Foetus,
1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality,14 N.Y.L.F. 411 (1968).
141. Justice Blackmun said, "[w]hen criminal abortion statutes were first enacted, the procedure was a hazardous one for the woman," citing [at 410 U.S. 148 n.43]
page 19 of C. Haagensen and W. Lloyd, A Hundred Years of Medicine (1943). The
difficulty with Blackmun's opinion is that he states conclusions about medicine with a
certitude the data does not support. For example, he observed that viability of a fetus
usually occurs at 28 weeks but may occur as early as 24 weeks; however, the source he
cites for this statement actually says that viability can vary between fetal weights of 400
grams (20 weeks gestation) and 1000 grams (28 weeks gestation). . . .The importance
of establishing fetal viability, according to Justice Blackmun, is that this is the point
where the state has a "compelling interest" in the protection of potential life.
Miller & Barron 1212-13.
142. Related examples emerge from an examination of New York Times v. Sullivan. For
instance:
The strength of the historical parallel in terms of the 18th-century consequences on
freedom of expression of a seditious libel prosecution, as compared with the 20th-century
consequences on freedom of expression of a civil defamation suit for damages, is examined at no place in the briefs, argument, or record with any rigorous comparative historical perspective. Furthermore, the authenticity of the historical texts discussing the Alien
and Sedition Law cited by the Times' counsel is nowhere subjected to critical examination by opposing counsel. Historical texts which might not be permitted to be introduced
in evidence at trial for any purpose thus are permitted to create an illusion of authority
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the Court acts as a fact-finder by liberally employing judicial notice,
"the lawsuit is in fact retried in the appellate court but without
benefit of counsel.'1 3 Surely this aspect of "Lochnering"l raises
serious questions concerning procedural due process,4 5 with the
Court simply informing itself in the process of forging new policy.'4
(5)

Proposition Number Five

Another proposition suggested by the earlier ones is that
"[n]ew doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court may emanate
partly from within and partly from without the Court's institutionalized information process."' 47 As one among several examples, the
trimester distinction for regulating abortions was not advanced
through either the briefs or oral arguments in the Abortion Cases.'
Miller and Barron therefore observe that "[t]hat legislative scheme
arose from the Justices themselves."' 4 Drawing upon and expanding the traditional conception of judicial notice, the Court became
a third party in the informing procedure. Likewise, the far-reaching
actual malice doctrine emerging from New York Times v. Sullivan
largely flowed from the policy-making operations and internal
means of informing used by the Court.' 50
(6) Proposition Number Six
The final proposition supports parallel conclusions by numerous commentators on the judicial system, yet contradicts the orthodox concept of adversary proceedings. This proposal is that "[t]he
Justices bring certain predilections, sometimes known and sometimes unknown, to the decisional process."' 5 ' Whereas the Justices
and authenticity before the Supreme Court by virtue merely of citation and quotations
in the brief.
Id. at 1214.
143. Id. at 1216. Or as similarly put by another writer, when an appellant "loses a case
because of a judge's in camera frolic beyond the material presented in the record and briefs,
he may well have been deprived of his day in court." Bernstein, The Supreme Court and
Secondary Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEo. L.J. 55, 63 (1968).
144. Ely, supra note 33, at 944.
145. See Miller & Barron 1218. The authors elaborate upon this argument at id. 122627.
146. See id. at 1218. In particular, see the discussion of independent research conducted
by the Justices, at id. 1215-16. See also Miller & Sastri, Secrecy and the Supreme Court: On
the Need for Piercingthe Red Velour Curtain,22 BUFFALO L. Rav. 799, 819 (1973).
147. Miller & Barron 1218.
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. See id.at 1218-22.
151. Id. at 1222. For similar conclusions see, e.g., B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); M. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (1933); J. FRANK, COURTS ON
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of the Supreme Court are active participants in the process of
information flow in landmark decisions, they furthermore may be
"the most important of the participants,' ' 2 and "the most impor1 53
tant fact-finders.'
Thus in the Abortion Cases Justice Blackmun drew upon several sources of information to substantiate the point of view that an
unborn child is not a "person" within the meaning of the Constitution. 5 ' Although Justice Blackmun plainly stated that the Court
would not answer the question of when life commences,'55 Professors
Miller and Barron say that essentially he did."6 Rather than being
an "arbiter" of legal controversies in the classic sense, the Supreme
Court is "a political actor," a legislator, whose members are guided
by subjective preferences. 157 The authors nevertheless acknowledge
that the evolution of the Court's policy-making functions may be a
natural result of the inability of lawyers, in most cases under the
current adversary system, to present relevant, policy-oriented data
to the Court.'5 8 They further concede that perhaps the myth of neutrality that surrounds the Court performs some useful purpose in
that it facilitates the maintenance of that institution's formal legitimacy within the American constitutional system.'59
TRIAL (1949); S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM ABEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE (1969); C. PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES, 1937-1947 (1948); G.
SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED, supra note 6; G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND,

supra note 6; Danelski, Values as Variables in JudicialDecision-Making: Notes Toward a
Theory, 19 VAND. L. REV. 721 (1966); Grossman, Social Backgrounds and JudicialDecisionMaking, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1551 (1966); Pound, MechanicalJurisprudence,8 COLUM. L. REV.
605 (1908); Schubert, JudicialAttitudes and Voting Behavior: The 1961 Term of the United
States Supreme Court, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 100 (1963); Tanenhaus, Supreme Court

Attitudes Toward FederalAdministrative Agencies, 1947-1956-An Application of Social
Science Methods to the Study of the JudicialProcess, 14 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1961).
152. Miller & Barron 1225.
153. Id. at 1226.
154. 410 U.S. at 158. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
155. 410 U.S. at 159. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
156. Miller & Barron at 1225:
But if, as Blackmun says, there is a wide divergence of thinking on the question,
by saying the judiciary could not provide the answer, in fact he did provide the answer.
Like the maid in Byron who "whispering 'I will ne'er consent'-consented," Justice

Blackmun, saying "we cannot do it," did it. The constitutional concept of a person that
encompasses corporations now excludes unborn children. That is a matter of philosophy,

not of logic.
157. Id. at 1223-25.
158. See id. at 1223.
159. Id. at 1229. But it is not completely clear that Miller and Barron accept the
promulgation of general norms, as in Times, Roe, and Doe, as a legitimate function of the
Court. See id. at 1228-33.

JUDICIAL POLICY-MAKING

1976]

C.

Critique of Miller and Barron

The specific objectives of Professors Miller and Barron must be
kept in mind in assessing their contribution to the literature. Theirs
is a "preliminary inquiry," a pilot study designed to stimulate further research. In this sense they deserve a great deal of credit for
their ground-breaking work in an important but neglected area.
Miller and Barron discuss quite clearly what they find to be key
elements within the informing process; they conceptualize information flow as a process within a broader judicial environment; and
they detect what amounts to a partial framework for a theory of
information flow to the Supreme Court. Moreover, they address not
only how the judicial mind was informed in these three landmark
cases, but also explain what ought to be the traits of the informing
process-including openness, the responsibility of the Justices to
"know what is knowable," the relevance of information flow in a
revised impression of the adversary process, and the safeguards
needed to insure due process of law.'
One should bear in mind further that the Miller-Barron analysis is not meant primarily to quarrel with the substance of Times,
Roe, and Doe. Rather, their article suggests that in these cases the
adversary system at the Supreme Court level did not function as
traditionally conceived, that in fact there were both formal and
informal information flows to the Justices, and that due process
may be denied when the Court draws upon information not open to
challenge during normal adversary proceedings. Nor are the authors
voicing opposition to the Court's performing a policy-making role in
the American governmental system. Instead, they are concerned
that the Court's structure and procedures should guarantee the
greatest integrity to the informing process and that the most valid
information possible should be applied to the formulation of judicial
policy. Under the Blackstone, or traditional, conception of the judicial process this is impossible. Yet if one accepts the policy-making
model, the information-flow process may be substantially improved.
Professors Miller and Barron acknowledge some of the limitations of their article. They realize that further research will be required to support fully some of their tentative findings. 6 ' Although
the authors carefully examine formal information flows to the Su160.

See id. at 1189-91, 1233-45. The safeguards suggested by the authors at 1233-45

are not, however, viewed as panaceas, but only as steps in the right direction.
161.

Id. at 1226.
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preme Court in these leading constitutional cases, they are aware
that their propositions are at this time applicable only to those
policy decisions. They understand,, too, that it is questionable to
assume that in those decisions the Court considered certain data
relevant simply because they were cited by the Justices.' A few
deficiencies, however, are not formally conceded by Miller and Bar13
ron.
Perhaps the most telling criticism is that they select three relatively unrepresentative constitutional cases from which to develop
propositions and then use the derived propositions to attack the
outdated Blackstone model. Of course, the authors assert that the
Supreme Court is far from the objective institution that the Blackstone model suggests, one meticulously weighing all data formally
presented in prominent constitutional cases and announcing a decision consistent with that data. But why study information flow in
decisions in which the Court went out of its way to utilize judicial
notice liberally and to make sweeping new policy? As Professor
Mayo suggests, to reach their decision in these cases, the Justices
may have had little need for data, but merely a "strong ethical
idea."'' 4 If the authors accept the view that the Supreme Court does
and should make policy in certain cases, without strictly heeding
the information presented to them, why underscore the due process
argument? In so doing Miller and Barron imply that it is important
what information is introduced to the Court and challenged during
adversary proceedings. Furthermore, given the view that in some
cases the Justices make law by drawing upon their personal predilections, backgrounds, and experiences, the authors should not be
disturbed by the Justices' extensive reliance upon legislative facts
during the informing process. In instances in which the Justices are
free to announce broad new policies, they should pay attention to
all reliable facts, adjudicative or otherwise, in order to formulate the
wisest policy.8 5
162.

In some instances this might be a plausible assumption, but such is not the case

here. In fact, much of Justice Blackmun's long historical account of attitudes toward abortions and their regulation, extending back to ancient times, has little bearing on the policy
handed down in Roe and Doe, particularly the trimester distinction for determining the point
of compelling state interest. The authors clearly anticipate this weakness by conceding that
"the judicial opinion is at best an imperfect instrument for revealing the data and premises
considered by judges to have been important in reaching their decisions." Id. at 1192.
163. Since the author participated with Professors Miller and Barron in the larger
study providing the background for both of these articles, he must also accept equal responsibility for the forthcoming weaknesses in that research.
164. See note 128 supra and accompanying text.
165. Another minor question is whether the authors understood these cases so well
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Although most of their propositions generally are sound, based
upon evidence from these cases, it seems that Professors Miller and
Barron overly generalize a few points. One proposition, for example,
is verified only by their examination of Times, not by an examination of the other two cases. Also, they periodically overstate, perhaps for emphasis, their indictment of the traditional conception of
the adversary system. To illustrate, few students of the judicial
process continue to accept the notion that members of the Supreme
Court "act as justice blindfolded, with strict impartiality and without personal preferences or predilections fed into their decisions.""'
This assumption, to the extent that it lingers, is rarely stated so
boldly.'67 Indeed, at least since the time of Cardozo's Storrs
Lectures,' 8 most Court observers have recognized that the personal
attitudes of judges weaken their "strict impartiality." Similarly, the
sixth proposition of Miller and Barron-that the Justices' decisions
are affected by their own predilections-is hardly new, as they are
aware. Nevertheless, at a time when statistical voting behavior
studies tend to be chiefly responsible for demonstrating this proposition, it is refreshing and reassuring to read a nonquantitative
study that furnishes direct support for it.
To point out potential limitations or weaknesses in this pioneering article is not to deny its substantial value. Professors Miller and
Barron lay a convincing "preliminary" foundation for what should
become an entire new line of study into the judicial informing process. Still, it would have been even more impressive had they attempted to answer a number of additional questions. Have these
informing and policy-making traits of Supreme Court process developed since the advent of the Warren and Burger Courts, or were they
present earlier? Beyond the information flows that affected outcomes in these cases, in what specific ways may these new policies
also have been influenced by the social, political, economic and
ethical backgrounds of the Justices?' Given the fact that certain
before commencing their formal study that they knew a priori the conclusions they would
reach. If this is so, then the authors' "propositions" are largely foregone conclusions and must
be distinguished from hypotheses, which by definition must be conceived prior to a study and
then be disproved or not. In any event, in order to promote greater confidence in their
propositions, the authors should have inspected more than three cases. This they recognize,
too, for it was their original intention. See note 11 supra.
166. Miller & Barron 1208-11.
167. Cf. ProfessionalResponsibility:Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159,
1161 (1958), and Lon Fuller's conditional view that a judge's ruling "must be as objective and
as free from bias as it possibly can." Fuller, supra note 93, at 34.
168. B. CARDOZO, supra note 151.
169. More specifically, even if Supreme Court policy is at times activated through the
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Justices were prone to deciding these cases liberally, and that others
leaned toward the status quo, was information in briefs and arguments principally presented by counsel to sway the Court's "swingmen"? Would more comprehensive and reliable information flows
have substantially affected the Court's decisions in these cases? Do
innovative Supreme Court policies typically reflect most of the data
presented to the Justices? Is it indeed possible to know how the
judicial mind is informed at any particular time? How is one to
determine what information is in fact critical to a specific decision?
Presumably the authors would suggest further research to provide
answers to these questions.
III.

TOWARD A MODEL OF INFORMATION FLOW TO THE SUPREME COURT

A basic assertion of this article is that thinking in terms of a
model facilitates an understanding of information flow to the Supreme Court. Simply defined, a model approximates a replica of
something in the real world, with all major component parts included in the representation and with relationships between those
parts suggested. A model is, moreover, a representation that
ultimately serves some descriptive, explanatory, or predictive purpose.
Since the research reported here is empirically supported by
only three major constitutional cases, the author claims no development of a highly technical model exactly corresponding to the actual
way in which the judicial mind is informed in all Supreme Court
decisions. Indeed, heeding the warning of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
that this process of informing the minds of judges is exceedingly
complex, 7 0 this study provides only a tenative, exploratory model.
liberal application of judicial notice, that leaves the residual question of why the Justices
decided on these particular policies rather than others. To understand fully the policy-making
process in these cases, the authors could have delved into the details of the Justices' backgrounds, experiences, and predilections, an approach that would go further toward actually
explaining why the Court handed down these policies. Although Miller and Barron recognize
that backgrounds, attitudes, and experiences affected these decisions, they fail to tell the
reader how. How, for instance, did Justice Blackmun's past connection with the Mayo Clinic,
or his basic religious identification and beliefs, affect his opinions in Roe and Doe? Information exchange among the Justices or the politics of judicial bargaining were also of import in
all likelihood, although this is virtually impossible to verify.
170. During oral argument in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Justice
Frankfurter is recorded to have remarked:
- . . in these matters this Court takes judicial notice of accredited writings, and it does
not have to call the writers as witnesses. How to inform the judicial mind, as you know,
is one of the most complicated problems. It is better to have witnesses, but I did not
know that we could not read the works of competent writers.
Frankfurter quoted in ARGUMENT: THE OPAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN
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Also heeding the advice of political scientists and law professors
responding to a questionnaire distributed during 1974, 171 an attempt
has been made to keep the models as simple as possible. 172 Others
will be required to extend this work-to test the model and to construct more detailed ones based on a larger and more representative
number of case studies.
An understandable approach to explaining the final model
proffered herein is to trace the step by step model-building procedure, from an elementary to a more refined representation of the
flow of information to the Supreme Court. To begin, a trio of concepts must be included in such a structure: information input, information conversion, and information output. Since the focus here is
upon information flow to the Supreme Court in the Abortion Cases
and Times, input is the most crucial of these and will be the recurring theme. Yet in order to present information input in its proper
context, conversion and output cannot be ignored or excluded because the three processes are inevitably interrelated.
Although the concept will be refined later, for present purposes
information input may be viewed as any facts, records, opinions,
briefs, or arguments received by one or more of the Justices that
pertain in any manner to a case decided on the merits by the Supreme Court. 7 1 Conversion, a process about which knowledge is
limited because of Court secrecy,1 74 involves the Justices' taking
available information, weighing it, and subsequently agreeing on a
decision.17 5 Output, by contrast, is evident when the Court publicly
V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952-1955, at 63 (L. Friedman ed. 1969).

171. See Appendix A infra.
172. For a discussion of the nature of models and their usefulness see Appendix B infra.
173. As discussed at text accompanying notes 176-203, 213-19, 235, 239 infra, and as
shown in Figure 10 infra, inputs may include briefs; opinions and records from lower courts;
oral arguments; the Justices' predilections, backgrounds, and experiences; judicial notice;
independent research by the Justices and their clerks; news reports; law reviews and legal
treatises; and information acquired through personal contacts or experienced sources. This
is clearly a broader conception of Supreme Court information than often appears in the
literature. See, e.g., J. EISENSTEIN, POLITICS AND THE LEGAL PROCESS (1973), who observes at
177 that "[t]he trial record, which along with briefs and oral arguments provides the information upon which the Court's formal opinions are based, is made in. . . lower courts." See
also notes 89-93 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, contrary to this conception, no
assumption is made here that these orthodox sources provide the Justices with the information upon which policies are founded. In fact, in the Abortion Cases and Times these sources
of information were of limited influence on the Court's ultimate rulings. See generallySection
H of this article.
174. For an analysis of secrecy on the Court see Miller & Sastri, supra note 146. For a
recent journalistic account see Totenberg, Behind the Marble, Beneath the Robes, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 16, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at 15, 58, 60, 63-67.
175. During the conversion state of the legal-policy decision process, information may
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announces and explains its decision. These cardinal aspects of the
information flow process at the Supreme Court level, entailing information to, through, and from the Justices, are shown in Figure 1.
This scheme shows that data from different sources, through
one or more channels, are relayed to the Court, presumably are
brought to the attention of Court members, and may be reflected
to some degree in the Justices' decision. But, of course, the model
is too simplistic to be of value. It accords with the schoolboy version
of the judiciary but does not deal with the complexities of the process.
FIGURE 1
SIMPLE INPUT-CONVERSION-OUTPUT CONCEPT

JUSTICES OF THE
SUPREME COURT

DECISION

)o = Flow of information
be considered in terms of its comprehensiveness, adequacy, validity, and reliability. See, e.g.,
Mayo & Jones, Legal-Policy Decision Process: Alternative Thinking and the Productive
Function, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 318, 361 (1964), citing Lanzetta & Kanareff, Information
Cost, Amount of Payoff, and Level of Aspirationas Determinantsof Information Seeking in
Decision Making, 7 BEHAVIORAL Sci. 459, 460 (1962):
The "adequacy of information" question permeates the whole decision-making function
and tends to increase in difficulty with the complexity of the problem. The question is
posed concerning the nature and quality of the information which must be acquired
before a decision can be made with confidence. Of course, the information which will
satisfy a criterion of desirable reliability may not be obtainable under any circumstances. If available, however, a "rational" decision maker must "be guided by the value of
the information as well as its cost in choosing whether to invest in information acquisition or not." But how "value" is to be assigned to possibly relevant information raises
an extremely complicated question.
See also the example presented in F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME
COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 309 (1928), and the discussion of Alfange,
supra note 113, at 641. At this stage, however, the Justices also interpret information in view
of their personal backgrounds, experiences, attitudes, and values. See Figure 2 infra. For a
survey of the literature relating to the conversion process see S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIOE, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM ch. 5 (2d ed. 1976).
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FIGURE 2
MODEL OF INFORMATION FLOW TO THE SUPREME COURT
BASED ON THE Abortion Cases AND New York Times v. Sullivan

EXTERNAL FLow OF INFORMATIONTO THE JtsrICES

Briefs, lower court
records, and opinions
for total number of
cases %hich could
potentially be decided

Oral arguments for cases
accepted. Depending on their
competence and sophistication,
counsel may suggest alternative
policies, or shift from narrow
to broad positions.

General problem
Law in the case

Narrow adjudicative facts
Urrrm STATEsSuPREsr CoL-TI

Court

acts as
"self-starter.
Should the Court

Yes

Court in

General
session*
Problemadioypnos

General

Decision-making

Problem

process

take te

Deciio

stating

"general norms";

deciding hypothetical
controveralhesti

No/

Cats not accepted
fort cision
i

Justices predilections,
n
Judicial
notice;xchanent
In exandedformhowevr,
thse
backgrounds, experiene,
integrity
of non- cnveentinalipt
research by the
etc.

data
legal
subject
to not
test
or challenge

and
Justices
their clerks

INFORMATION INTERNALTO THE COUIrr

*At this point there may occur varying degrees of information exchange among the Justices.

In expanded form, however, these conventional inputconversion-output concepts are useful in presenting Figure 2. Again,
that model is based upon the Miller-Barron analysis of Times and
the Abortion Cases, and therefore upon the six resulting propositions. Stressing input, Figure 2 indicates that both external and
internal flows of information come to the Court, as explained in
proposition number five.171 To be sure, in the cases examined much
176. See notes 147-50 supra and accompanying text. For a general discussion of internal
and external inputs see J. SIGLER, supra note 99; Miller & Sastri, supra note 146, at 819-22;

Sigler, A Cybernetic Model of the JudicialSystem, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 398, 408-13 (1968). However, it should be noted that there are differences in Sigler's conception of internal and
external inputs and those adopted here.
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data came to the Court from traditional external sources-from
counsels' briefs and arguments.'77 But contrary to the widely accepted notion of how the judicial mind is informed, arguments and
briefs in Roe and Doe failed to provide data relating to the central
concept-the trimester code of permissible abortions-adopted in
the Court's decisions. 7 Likewise, the actual malice doctrine announced in 1964 was never specifically briefed and argued by Herbert Wechsler, attorney for the New York Times.'7 9
External flows are thus shown in Figure 2 as consisting of two
principal elements, but these do not receive the strong emphasis
suggested by the Blackstone conception. 80 The first external flow
consists of briefs by attorneys for the litigants, lower court records,
and opinions for the total number of cases that the Court has discretion to decide. The acceptance of amicus curiae briefs also is a
special means whereby the Justices allow additional external flows
of information to be presented with a resulting tendency to increase
the likelihood that a wide range of viewpoints will come to the
forefront. In all these instances, as described in the first proposition, 8 ' the Justices (and their clerks) receive written information
177. See, e.g., notes 115-17 supra and accompanying text.
178. See note 148 supra and accompanying text. Nor did that concept come from lower
court records. This provides support for the related conclusion of Professors Richardson and
Vines: "[w]ith the major portion of its docket, the Supreme Court was acting entirely alone
in articulating its decisional values, without any recorded support from any of the judges who
sat on the circuit courts or on the district courts." R. RICHARDSON & VINES, supra note 101,
at 156.
179. See note 150 supra and accompanying text.
180. Writing in the eighteenth century, Sir William Blackstone asserted that judges
"are the depositaries of the laws; the living oracles, who must decide in all cases of doubt,
and who are bound by an oath to decide according to the law of the land." 1 W. BLACKSTONE
COMMENTARIES *69. Blackstone's conception, the judges find or declare rather than make
law, has of course long been recognized by many commentators as an inaccurate way of
portraying the policy-making process of the United States Supreme Court. Nevertheless, his
ideas provide a contrast to the models presented herein, and a starting point from which one
may view how some have thought Supreme Court Justices inform themselves in cases brought
for decision. According to Blackstone, major sources of judicial information include customs,
"maxims," and "the law of the land" as reflected in prior recorded judicial decisions. Judges
are obligated to apply previous decisions and to "declare" the law according to precedent.
This concept of decision-making is exceedingly important to the classical model of judicial
information flow, for judges do not rely on their personal backgrounds and views of what is
"right" for society in a particular question. Nor is there provision in the Blackstone model
for informational input via legal research by the judges or their clerks (except as to precedent), for the influence of legal treatises, for the gaining of information through informal
personal contacts, or for what is now referred to as "social science data." Judges instead rely
on their own knowledge, understanding, and experience with reference to their predecessor's
decisions. The major exception is that courts may deviate from precedent when it was in fact
"not law," that is, when it clearly conflicts with custom, reason, or "the divine law."
181. See generally notes 101-11 supra and accompanying text.
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concerning a broad problem, the law in the case, and narrow adjudicative facts. Of these, the general problem appeared of most concern
to the Justices in Times, Roe, and Doe; they were far less interested
in the narrow facts and prior legal standards.'8 Although litigants are sometimes "politically relevant sources
and carriers of demands and information," ' 3 the specific status of
the litigants in these cases was of little import to the Justices.'84
Accordingly, they seem to have approached these issues with a full
recognition that they were about to formulate new, exceedingly important rules of law. It is here, as shown in the model, that the Court
may essentially act as a "self-starter," contrary to the traditional
conception,"" by answering the question: "Should this case be accepted for decision?"' 186 If the answer is no, as is usual, the case is
ejected from the decisional process.'87 If the answer is yes, then the
information, particularly that which concerns the general problem,
becomes an input into the formal case hearing. In answering this
question the Chief Justice plays a strategic role; he is most responsible for examining writs for certiorari-by far the greatest source of
182. See notes 106 & 110 supra and accompanying text.
183. S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, supranote 175, at 4.
184. See notes 106 & 111 supra and accompanying text.
185. In the words of Mr. Justice Jackson, the Court "has no self-starting capacity and
must await the action of some litigant so aggrieved as to have a justiciable case." R. JACKSON,
THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 24 (1955).

186. This determination is normally made on a tenative, individual basis without formal consultation among the Justices. See Brennan, Inside View of the High Court, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 6, 1963, § 6 (Magazine) at 35, 100. However, the decision to accept a case where
a lower court conflict occurs is an important part of the Court's policy-making process.
Professor Howard's findings are pertinent here:
[Tie cannot leap to the conclusion that the Supreme Court was basically supportive of original tribunals. . . . [Tihe Justices supported whoever agreed with them in
whatever interested them in appeals. . . . [T]he Supreme Court was less interested
in resolving intracircuit disagreements per se than in resolving the policy disputes with
which those disagreements correlated. In other words, Supreme Court review of the three
courts of appeals in this period was less the resolution of lower court conflicts than
"applied politics"-securing the supremacy of highly selective policy values irrespective
of levels.
Howard, Litigation Flow in Three United States Courts of Appeals, 8 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 33,
49 (1973). See also G. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR ch. 4 (1959).
187. More specifically, petitions for review are read and screened by the Justices (with
the assistance of their clerks) for purposes of discussion at conference. If no Justice feels that
the case warrants conference time, it is dropped from the information flow process. Hence,
"[t]he vast majority of cases, having aroused no Justice's interest, automatically go on what
is known as 'the dead list' and are denied further consideration." Totenberg, supra note 174,
at 58. According to the "rule of four," at least four Justices must agree that a case on the
conference list deserves Court review before the appeal actually becomes an integral part of
the informing process-a part of the process by virtue of the fact that it is placed on the
calendar and is to be decided. See generally Leiman, The Rule of Four, 57 COLUM. L. REV.
978 (1957).
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potential decisions-and for orally presenting them at the Court
conference."'8
Normally, some four to six months after the original petition,
oral arguments-the other major external source of informationenter the picture, as shown in Figure 2.189 Compared to briefs,
records, and opinions, oral arguments involve a different channel
of communication: usually a thirty minute to one hour period of
face-to-face information flow during which "communication links
1 ' between
are bilateral""
each counsel and the individual Justices.
Figure 2 also reflects the concept that during argument counsel
vary greatly as to competence and sophistication in influencing the
Court's decision.19 ' That more competent and sophisticated advo188. Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the DecisionalProcess of the Supreme Court, in THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: READINGS IN PROCESS AND BEHAVIOR 147, 149
(T. Jahnige & S. Goldman eds. 1968). The Chief Justice's role was strengthened by the
Court's adoption of a "special list" under Charles Evans Hughes. David Danelski provides
the following insightful analysis of the special list and its relationship to the decisional
process:
If the Chief Justice decided that a petition for certiorariwas frivolous or ill-founded and
therefore did not merit conference discussion, he placed it on a "special list" which was
circulated to the Associates. Upon request, any case on the special list would be transferred to the regular take-up list, but cases remaining on the special list were automatically denied certiorariwithout discussion. Hughes disposed of about 60 percent of the
petitions for certiorarivia the special list, and rarely did a Justice challenge his lists.
Challenges were also relatively rare during Stone's Chief Justiceship.
Id. at 150. See also note 234 infra. For a more recent discussion, with changes that have been
made since Warren Burger's appointment as Chief Justice, see S. Wasby, The Supreme
Court's Docket, Discretionary Jurisdiction, and Judicial Behavior Studies (paper delivered
at the 1975 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Ass'n, to appear in S. WASBY,
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE: FROM THE WARREN COURT TO THE BURGER COURT (1976)).
189. For a discussion of the role of the oral argument in the informing process see, e.g.,
Harlan, What PartDoes the OralArgument Play in the Conduct of an Appeal? 41 CORNELL
L.Q. 6 (1955). While oral argument has traditionally been held strictly to an allotted one hour
for each side, the length of argument has been known to extend from thirty minutes to a
number of hours, depending on the complexity and importance of the issues. See H. ABRAHAM,
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES,

192 (3d ed. 1975).
190. G. SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING: THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE COURTS 130 (2d
ed. 1974).
191. See note 114 supra.It is amusing to note Chief Justice Stone's candid comments
on the striking shortcomings of some attorneys arguing cases before the Supreme Court.
Alpheus T. Mason has reported these comments in the following terms:
When he grumbled, his spleen was vented on the highly paid lawyers, the prima donnas
of the bar, whose arguments often obfuscated what they should have clarified. "Damn
it," he would say, "that opinion I just wrote will make more for the petitioner's lawyer
than I get paid for a whole year's work on the Court. If I'm going to have to keep on
doing all the work on these complicated cases which the lawyers don't understand and
don't give me any help on, I think I'll go back to practice and write the briefs instead of
the opinions. If I have to do the attorneys' work for them, I might as well get paid
accordingly."
Stone quoted in A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 317 (1956).
ENGLAND, AND FRANCE
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cates occasionally will suggest alternative policies to members of
the Court was illustrated in proposition number two. 9 ' In Times
a Columbia University Law School professor, highly trained and
experienced in the subtleties of Supreme Court practice and decision-making, presented the Court with a wide range of policy
alternatives. He was opposed by a capable Alabama attorney, who
nonetheless was far more traditional in his approach to the Justices
and who had accumulated nowhere near the same amount of experi'
ence arguing before the Supreme Court. 93
Further, depending upon how oral argument develops, counsel
may shift from a narrow to a broad policy position, also as depicted
in Figure 2. This tendency, which was most evident in Times, as
explained in proposition number three,'94 occurs when Justices indicate a willingness to consider a broader holding than one that would
naturally follow from counsel's main line of argument. ' In the libel
decision, then, Professor Wechsler attentively perceived the Justices' cues during argument and broadened his position to encompass what ultimately became a newly expanded principle of actual
malice.'
Internal information, as well as external, may have a key effect
on the decision of the Court to take a case, on how oral argument
proceeds, and ultimately on the holding reached by the Justices. As
expressed in proposition number six, one internal source falls under
the general rubric of the Justices' predilections, backgrounds, and
experiences. 97 These considerations may influence the flow and interpretation of information at each stage shown in Figure 2, as they
apparently did when Mr. Justice Blackmun concluded in the
'9 8
Abortion Cases that a fetus was not a "constitutional person."'
Similarly, prior to the final decisional process, a Justice's background, attitudes, and experience may combine in such a way as to
affect a colleague's decision on whether the Court should in fact
192. See notes 112-27 supra and accompanying text. For an interesting interpretation
of why counsel offer varying types of arguments to the Court see J. CASPER, LAWYERS BEFORE
THE WARREN COURT (1972).
193. See note 133 supra and accompanying text.
194. See notes 129-33 supra and accompanying text.
195. See notes 130 & 131 supra and accompanying text.
196. See id.
197. See notes 151 & 157 supra and accompanying text. Prominent studies touching
upon these variables are listed at note 151 supra. Others include H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND
PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT (1974); D. DANELSKI, A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE IS APPOINTED (1964); J. SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT:
ITS POLITICS, PERSONALITIES, AND PROCEDURES (1960). See also Justice Blackmun's implicit
recognition of some of these factors in the Roe decision, as quoted at note 53 supra.
198. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
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accept a particular case for review. 9' Another internal source is
independent research by the Justices and their clerks, which often
adds a different dimension of informational input that is reflected
in the Court's decision. 00° Still another related and increasingly important source, analyzed in proposition number four 2 1 and included
in Figure 2, is a vastly expanded use of judicial notice. 2 In short,
all of these internal sources of information may influence written
and oral communications among the 2Justices
during the policy3
making and opinion-writing processes. 1
199. In other words, a Justice may present the information in a case so persuasively that
his colleagues will agree to accept it, despite weak or unpersuasive briefs. As put by one Court
observer:
Occasionally, when there are not enough votes to grant review, one Justice will write
a dissent from the refusal to hear the case. And here the game gets really interesting,
for it is not unusual for the dissent to be so persuasive that the other Justices change
their minds. The briefs in a case are often so poor that the Justice's dissent provides
the only available serious presentation of the case.
Totenberg, supra note 174, at 58. Likewise, during the opinion writing process, a dissenting
Justice's presentation of information and arguments may be so convincing as to entice a
majority of the Court to his way of thinking. See H. ABRAHAM, THE JuDIciARY: THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE GOVERNMENTAL PRocEss 31-32 (2d ed. 1969).
200. On independent research by the Justices see, e.g., Wyzanski, A Trial Judge'sFreedom and Responsibility, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1295-96 (1952). For the role of the Justices'
law clerks in research and the information flow process see Rehnquist, Who Writes Decisions
of the Supreme Court?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 13, 1957, at 74-75.
Rehnquist's comments are particularly interesting. Writing fifteen years before his appointment to the Supreme Court, and four years after serving as a clerk for Justice Robert
H. Jackson, Rehnquist emphasized the key role of the clerks in processing and condensing
information presented in petitions for certiorari:
In Justice Jackson's office, the petitions for certiorari which were scheduled to be
discussed at the next conference of the Justices were split between the two clerks. Each
clerk would then prepare memoranda on the petitions assigned to him. These would
include the facts of the case, the law as declared by the lower courts, and a brief
summary of previous cases involving the same point. They concluded with a recommendation by the clerk either that the petition be granted or that it be denied. Aided by
this data, the Justice himself would then study the petitions in order to determine his
vote. I believe that a procedure substantially similar to that just outlined was followed
in the offices of a majority of the other Justices during the time that I was a clerk.
Id. at 74.
201. See notes 134-46 supra and accompanying text.
202. However, judicial notice is not considered by many observers to provide an acceptable basis for judicial decisions. In the words of Frankfurter and Landis:
[C]ourts support legislative policy by drawing on information based on common knowledge or in books of reference. Courts use such material on their own initiative on the
theory of "judicial notice." But this is a tenuous basis for informing the judicial mind.
It places an undue burden of independent investigation on judges who are limited in
their facilities and still more limited by the pressure of business.
F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 175, at 313-14.
203. Illustrative and insightful is former Justice Tom Clark's discussion of communications among the Justices during the opinion writing stage:
In the average case an opinion requires three weeks' work in preparation. When the
author concludes that he has an unanswerable document, it is printed in the print shop
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IV.

EXPANDING AND REFINING THE SUPREME COURT MODEL

Thus far the construction and explanation of this model of Supreme Court information flow has been oriented toward information
coming to the Court, as suggested by the study of Professors Miller
and Barron. As mentioned in the introduction, the preceding section
is therefore generally inductive in nature, resting upon the functioning of the adversary system in New York Times v. Sullivan, Roe v.
Wade, and Doe v. Bolton. By contrast, the present section is designed to go beyond the analysis of Professors Miller and Barron by
incorporating deductive, theoretical elements into the evolving
model. These additions are derived primarily from three modeling
or theoretic approaches-systems theory, communicationinformation theory, and schema theory. By adding these elements
one can more easily understand and analyze information flow to,
through, and from the United States Supreme Court. Ultimately
this line of thought will lead to the formulation of further propositions to be tested, and to suggestions as to unexplored areas of
research into Supreme Court information flow and policy-making.
A.

IncorporatingElements from Systems Theory

Each of the six propositions derived from the Miller-Barron
study of Times and the Abortion Cases is plainly manifested in the
basic inductive model. Against this background the task is now to
introduce more complete representations of information flow to,
from, and back to the Supreme Court, again with the focus on input.
These structures go past the inductive model in Figure 2. To refine
that model, the concepts first considered are information
environment and feedback. They can be understood most readily
through a brief explanation of systems analysis.
Since David Easton first popularized systems analysis as a
framework for political research," 4 scholars have proposed that it or
in the Supreme Court building and circulated to each of the Justices. Then the fur begins
to fly. Returns come in, some favorable and many otherwise. In controversial cases, and
all have some touches of controversy, the process often takes months. The cases are often
discussed by the majority both before and after circulation. The final form of the opinion

is agreed upon at the Friday conferences. Of course, any Justice may dissent or write
his own views on a case. These are likewise circulated long before the opinion of the
majority is announced.
Clark, Internal Operation of the United States Supreme Court, 43 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 45, 51
(1959). See also Clark, Inside the Court, in THE SUPREME COURT: VIEWS FROM INSIDE 45, 49-50

(A. Westin ed. 1961); Brennan, Inside View of the High Court, supra note 186.
204. D. EASTON, A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1965); D. EASTON, A SYSTEM
ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIrFE (1965); Easton, An Approach to the Analysis of PoliticalSystems,
9 WORLD POL. 383 (1957).
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highly related approaches be used as a means for exploring the
judicial process." 5 It provides a macroscopic conceptual scheme of
heuristic value, through which one may view the Supreme Court's
receipt of information from its total environment by means of feedback mechanisms. In short, systems analysis may be adopted to
illuminate the totality of the Court's information flow process.0 '
FIGURE

3
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FEEDBACK-
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Figure 3, the broadest presented to this point, is a modified
systems model showing the Court as a subsystem of the entire
American legal-political-economic-social system. The Court is, in
205. S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, supra note 175; T. Jahnige & S. Goldman, supra note
188, at 1-4; W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 32 (1964); G. SCHUBERT, supra note
190, at 140; Becker, Judicial Structure and Its PoliticalFunctioning in Society: New Approaches to Teaching and Research in Public Law, 29 J. OF POL. 302 (1967); Goldman &
Jahnige, EastonianSystems Analysis and Legal Research, 2 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 285 (1970);
Goldman & Jahnige, Systems Analysis and Judicial Systems: Potential and Limitations, 3
POLITY 334 (1971); Grossman, A Model for JudicialPolicy Analysis: The Supreme Court and
the Sit-In Cases, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH 405 (J. Grossman & J. Tannenhaus eds.
1969); Nagel, A ConceptualScheme of the JudicialProcess,7 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Dec.
1963, at 4; Sigler, A Cybernetic Model of the JudicialSystem, supra note 176, at 398.
206. For an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of judicial systems analysis see
S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, supra note 175, at 292-93. They conclude that judicial systems
analysis is quite useful for organizational and heuristic purposes, but of little value for prediction and measurement.

19761

JUDICIAL POLICY-MAKING

other words, surrounded by an environment. As illustrated in Roe,
Doe, and Times, that environment includes state laws and practices, and broad questions which of necessity contain political, ethical, economic, and social implications, in addition to constitutional
ones."'7 Thus the Court does not function in a vacuum, and occurrences within its environment significantly influence the flow or
type of information going to the Court. Interactions normally characterized by the flow of information, occur between the judicial
subsystem and its environment.
FIGURE

4

SYSTEMS-ORIENTED MODEL OF

JUDICIAL INFORMATION FLOW

ENVIRONMENT:

Political, Legal, Social, Economic

ENVIRONMENT:

Political, Legal, Social, Economic

*At this point there may occur varying degrees of information exchange among the Justices.

207.

See generally Sections I and I supra of this article.
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In Figure 4 a number of information traits identified in the
analysis of Times and the Abortion Cases (presented in Figure 2)
are combined with elements of the systems model (presented in
Figure 3). Figure 4 indicates that the Justices receive external information input-customarily called demands, supports, and expectations in systems terminology 21°-in the form of briefs, records, opinions, and arguments. Internal information flows and inputs are evident when Court members exchange ideas in oral or written form,
take judicial notice, conduct independent research, or when they
filter information through their own attitudes, backgrounds, and
experiences. The final ruling is then communicated to the Court's
environment, impacting with various formal and informal aspects
of the American system, as it did upon the press in Times and upon
abortion practices in Roe and Doe.211 The impact of these decisions
in turn may result in new information coming to the Court through
feedback mechanisms in the form of records, opinions, briefs and
arguments, as seen for example in the case of Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.2 0 A feedback or interactive process also may exist among the
components of external and internal information flows. For instance, briefs or lower court opinions and records clearly influence
oral arguments. Likewise, a Justice's predilections, background,
and experience may affect the results of his independent research
or his exercise of judicial notice.
208. See S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, supra note 175, at ch. 4.
209. For major studies dealing with the Court and its environment see generally J.
SCHMIDHAUSER & L. BERG, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONGRESS: CONFLICT AND INTERACTION,
1945-1968 (1972); R. SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY (1971); M. SHAPIRO,
THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

(1968); Wasby, The Communicationof the

Supreme Court's Criminal ProcedureDecisions: A PreliminaryMapping, 18 VILL. L. REV.
1086 (1973). For works specifically involving the impact of Court decisions see THE IMPACT OF
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: EMPIRICAL STUDIES (2d ed. T. Becker & M. Freeley eds. 1973); S.
WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME PERSPECTIVES (1970); Miller,
On the Need for "ImpactAnalysis" of Supreme Court Decisions,53 GEO. L.J. 365 (1965). Also
note that, as shown in Figure 4, when the Justices refuse to accept a case, that refusal may
also have an impact on the Court's environment, as does a case accepted and formally
decided.
210. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). This feedback process has been described by Goldman and
Jahnige as follows:
The outputs return "to haunt the system" by stimulating behavioral responses by
members of the political system. These responses are fed back to the authorities (this is
called "information feedback") through various formal and informal channels. The impact, existence of compliance or noncompliance, or the changes in the level and kind of
support, or of attempts to limit the authorities and redefine the boundaries of the
system, are all communicated to the judicial authorities through these channels.
S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, supra note 175, at 7.
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Some Contributions of Communication and Information
Models
The broad boundaries of an exploratory model have been outlined thus far. Now the emphasis again becomes information input
to the Court. Communication and information models are valuable

B.

for further understanding this.211 The next step in the model-

building procedure is an explanation of the potential contribution
addition
of communication and information theory, followed by the
21 2
literature.
the
from
concepts
appropriate
to Figure 4 of
Fundamentals of communication models have been stated in
several ways, but most of the rudiments are summarized by Harold
Lasswell's conceptual question: who says what, through which
"3

channel, to whom, with what effect?2

Figure 5, in simplified form,

reflects the gist of this approach. In large measure, this structure is
congruent with Figure 4, though the concepts are more specialized.
FIGURE 5

BASIc COMMUNICATION CONCEPT

Input Variables
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message?

WHAT is the
message
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Channel Variables
HOW is the
message
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Reception Variables
To WHOM
does the
message go?

With what
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In external information flows, the lawyers are the senders of the
message. Information communicated includes that respecting the

broad problem, the law in the case, and narrow adjudicative facts.
As for the channel variables, messages are sent in written form in
briefs, lower court opinions and records, but orally through argument before the Justices. In terms of reception, information is
211.
212.

See Schubert, supra note 7.
In addition to works cited henceforth, the following discussion is generally based

on R. ACKOFF & F. EMERY, ON PURPOSEFUL SYSTEMS 179-95 (1972); D. BARNLUND, INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION: SURVEY AND STUDIES (1968); M. DE FLEUR & 0. LARSEN, THE FLOW OF

INFORMATION (1958); K. DEUTSCH, THE NERVES OF GOVERNMENT (1966); R. GOLDMAN, CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 48-81 (1972); D. JAROS & L. GRANT, POLITICAL BEHAVIOR:
CHOICES AND PERSPECTIVES 329-42 (1974); K. SERENO & C. MORTENSEN, FOUNDATIONS OF COM-

MUNICATION THEORY (1970); Deutsch, Communication Theory and PoliticalIntegration, in

THE INTEGRATION OF POLITICAL COMMUNITIES 46 (P. Jacob & J. Toscano eds. 1964).
213. Lasswell, The Structure and Functions of Communication in Society, in THE
COMMUNICATION OF IDEAS 37 (L. Bryson ed. 1948). See also Mayo & Jones, note 175 supra, at
398-417 for an application of this basic framework to the predictive function.
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mainly relayed to the Court as an institution in the early stages of
the case. After it is accepted for decision, data regarding the case
go principally to the Justices sitting en banc during oral argument.
The effect of messages on Court members varies as to the Justices
receiving them, as was shown in the Abortion Cases and New York
Times v. Sullivan.214 The data's effect, if at all indicated by variances in interpretation, was substantially different on Justice
Rehnquist's restrictive view than on Justice Blackmun's far broader
interpretation in the abortion issue, for instance. 215
Less is known about the Court's internal flow of information
than about external data coming to it, but works like that of Alpheus T. Mason on Chief Justice Stone 216 provide the basis for some
plausible speculations. In terms of the input variable, any one of the
Justices may initiate a message to any one of his colleagues, usually
after oral argument, when generally "every justice participates at
each and every stage of every opinion. ' 217 Information flows may
also go to Court members from clerks and staff. Messages may
pertain to the law in the case, narrow adjudicative facts, relevant
nonlegal data, the decision whether to take judicial notice of related facts, or findings based upon independent research by the
Justices and their clerks.
There is a likelihood, however, according to proposition number
one, 21 8 that such internal information flows will center around the
general problem presented in a case. Critical considerations might
include the following: What are the boundaries of the problem?
What impacts would alternative decisions have on the American
legal system, politics, and government, economic and social processes, business and industry, etc.? Would any of these alternative
rulings create major problems for the Court in the future? Which of
the possible decisional paths should be eliminated from considera214. See generally Section II of this article supra.
215. See note 33 supra. See also Miller & Barron, supra note 9, at 1196.
216. A. MASON, supra note 191. A number of other prominent articles and books written
by or about Supreme Court Justices also provide sporadic insights. See, e.g., Brennan,

Working at Justice, in

AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT

(A. Westin ed. 1963);

Brennan, supra note 186; Clark, Internal Operation of the United States Supreme Court,
supra note 202; C. FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT 1862-1890 (1939);

J.

FRANK, JUSTICE DANIEL DISSENTING (1964); W. KING, MELVILLE WESTON FULLER: CHIEF
JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES 1888-1910 (1950); C. McGRATH, MORRISON R. WAITE: THE
TRIUMPH OF CHARACTER (1963); A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE (1946); A. MASON,
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE (1964); D. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON: THE
FIRST DISSENTER

(1954); M.

PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES

(2 vols., 1951); C.

SWISHER, ROGER

B. TANEY (1935); C. SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW (1930); A. Westin,

supra note 203.

217. H.
218.

ABRAHAM, supra note 189, at 32.
See note 101 supra and accompanying text.
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tion because of their likely future implications? Given the facts and
law in the case, how should the Court publicly explain or justify its
ruling? What alternative decisions would insure a larger and more
cohesive Court majority? Channels for internal information flows
would be chiefly through personal judicial contacts or memoranda.
Again, messages would go to any other Court member with varying
effects, depending on such variables as individual Justices' experiences, predilections, and backgrounds." '
A fundamental assumption of the adversary process is that, by
the time a case reaches the Supreme Court, the pertinent data are
"already explored and sifted by trial and intermediate tribunals. ' 20
In the appellant's brief in Roe v. Wade, social science and medical
data with regard to abortions were said to have been "carefully
'22
sifted in order to present the most directly relevant materials. '
This process continues, however, at the Supreme Court level in
what is termed informationprocessing and condensationin Figure
6. There the model is conceived in terms of an inverted cone into
which varieties of information flow. 222 Information is collected
through different channels, processed and condensed, with redundant, irrelevant or untrustworthy communications discarded before
conversion.
In view of the vast amounts of information going to the Justices
and their burdensome caseloads,2 3 the purpose of processing and
condensation is of course to prevent "demand input overload" 224 and
to facilitate the Court's reaching a decision. 2 51 Holdings are then
219. See the discussion of Proposition No. 6 at notes 151 & 157 and accompanying text
supra.
220. Frankfurter & Hart, text accompanying note 92 supra. But, of course, this does
not mean that intermediate courts simply pass pertinent data on to the Supreme Court
without making policy in many instances. The United States Courts of Appeals, for example,
do not function "merely to screen, filter, and apply federal law so that the Justices may
innovate. As courts of last resort in the overwhelming majority of cases, they make national
law residually and regionally." Howard, supra note 186, at 50.
221. Brief for Appellants, Roe v. Wade, quoted in Miller & Barron, supra note 9, at
1200.
222. This idea was suggested for this study by Professor Thomas A. Cowan, Rutgers
University School of Law, Newark. Inverted cones are used to emphasize the concepts of
processing and condensation.
223. See notes 265 & 268 infra and accompanying text.
224. See S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, supra note 175, at 110-11.
225. The concept of "processing" is used in other models. See, e.g., T. Jahnige & S.
Goldman, supra note 188, at 4. For the general processing of writs of certiorari, as an illustration, see Tanenhaus, Schick, Muraskin, & Rosen, The Supreme Court's Certiorari
Jurisdiction: Cue Theory, in JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 111 (G. Schubert ed. 1963). For a
recent analysis of the Court's caseload, its processing and screening, see Casper & Posner, A
Study of the Supreme Court's Caseload, 3 J. OF LEGAL STUnIES 339 (1974). See also the
recommendations of the so-called Freund Committee in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF
THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT (1972).
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FIGURE 6
SIMPLIFIED PROCESSING-CONDENSATION MODEL

communicated to the outside world, and information returns once

more to the Court through feedback loops.226 In future instances
when the Court accepts related cases for decision, this information
may again be processed and condensed for further rulings. 27
Through this figure one also may better comprehend the usefulness
226. See text accompanying notes 204-06, 209-10 supra.
227. Note, however, that it is relatively rare that the Court has this opportunity. As
one law professor observed during the course of this study, "so long as issues have to be
brought to the courts rather than be initiated by the courts, does this not necessarily mean
that the feedback loops will always be delayed, distorted, and generally unreliable in terms
of placing the judiciary in the position to make appropriate corrections to past decisions?"
Questionnaire response by Professor Louis H. Mayo, The National Law Center, The George
Washington University. See also Wells & Grossman, The Concept of JudicialPolicy-Making:
A Critique, 15 J. PUB. L. 286, 306 (1966).
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of a model.2

8

1

It helps us visualize a complex process within a small

amount of space and suggests the hypothesis that there may exist a
major time lag between the Court's ruling and the time when it may
again act as a self-starter by having an opportunity to make related
policy. Moreover, during this time lag it is entirely possible that
229
information distortion will occur.

Another fundamental concept of communication theory, and
one closely associated with processing and condensation, is
information screening. While processing refers here to organizing
and recording information, condensation results from the screening
process and the memoranda written to the Justices by their clerks
summarizing data that may be considered by Court members in
particular cases. 20 As explained earlier, external information input

means any petitions, opinions, records, facts, or arguments coming
to the attention of the Court in a case before it (or potentially to
come before it) for decision.3 When information is passed in this
general fashion from an individual, group, or organization to one or
more of the Justices, the process of communication occurs, provided
that the message received has essentially the same meaning to both
the sender and the receiver.
During this processing and condensation, and before most information is seriously considered by Supreme Court members, it
undergoes some type of screening, perhaps best illustrated by the
handling of writs for certiorari by law clerks.2 3 Condensation is evi-

dent, however, at other stages of the information flow process. Although not specifically shown in the models, oral argument may be
viewed as an example of a Court procedure used to screen and
condense information. As John Schmidhauser has written, "[i]f
counsel fulfills his role properly in oral argument, he performs a
substantial service by assisting the Court in getting to the heart of
the matter swiftly; if he performs incompetently, he wastes the
Court's valuable time.

' 23 3

In Figure 7 the processing-screening-

condensation procedure is artificially separated into distinct stages,
improving upon the preceding structure.2s4
228.
229.
230.

See notes 285-87 infra and accompanying text.
See, e.g., S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, supra note 175, at 250-57.
See note 200 supra.

231. See note 173 supra and accompanying text.
232. See note 200 supra. Of course, prior to the time that a case reaches the Court, lower
courts also perform the basic screening function. This in fact is a basic underlying cause of
current controversy over the need for a National Court of Appeals. See note 265 infra.
233.
234.

J. SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 197, at 138.
Literature on details of processing, screening, and condensing of information to

and within the Court is reasonably meager, but there are a few examples. For a general

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
FIGURE

[Vol. 29:45

7

INFORMATION PROCESSING-SCREENING-CONDENSATION

Information
Processing

Information *-Information
Screening 3Condensation

The Court

Decisio

This portion of the model is next added to Figure 4, yielding a
more thorough overview of the information flow process in Figure 8.
Note, too, that Figure 8 includes other possible external sources of
information (as well as possible interactions or feedback processes
between those sources and those previously discussed). Specifically,
the new sources listed in the third box account for the likelihood
that in some cases the Court may receive information through atypical means and from unorthodox sources, such as means and sources
other than those normally coming up through the adversary system
in the form of lower court opinions and records, briefs, and oral
arguments.
A number of illustrations of "atypical" information flows to the
Court may be drawn from the questionnaire data.25 First are the
discussion of the entire process from the time of appeal to the final Court decision see J.
SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 197, ch. 6. For the general sifting of cases before decision see R.
STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 276-92 (2d ed. 1954). For the strategic role
of the Chief Justice in handling petitions for certiorari see Danelski, supra note 188. For a
more specialized aspect of screening see the discussion of the Solicitor General's interface
with the Supreme Court in Griswold, Rationing of Justice-The Supreme Court's Caseload
and What the Court Does Not Do, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 335 (1975). Dean Griswold observes
that in cases which a federal agency or federal official has lost in lower court but wants to
appeal to the Supreme Court, "[uln effect, the Solicitor General does most of the screening
which is done in other cases by the Supreme Court, for he tries to take to the Court only cases
which, based upon his close observation of the work of the Court, he thinks that the Court
will accept." Id. at 344. See also the analysis of screening in Rehnquist, supra note 200; Casper
& Posner, supra note 225; FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 225. For reference to experimentation with screening at the U.S. Court of Appeals level see Burger, Report on the Federal
Judicial Branch-1973, 59 A.B.A.J. 1125, 1127 (1973); Haworth, Screening and Summary
Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1973 WAsH. U.L.Q. 257.
235. See Appendix A infra. In an earlier article on judicial secrecy, Professors Arthur
Miller and D. S. Sastri alluded to a number of additional instances of "unorthodox" information flow and procedures. See Miller & Sastri, supra note 146, at 821.
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more conventional and obvious ones: the mass media; law reviews;
books and less specialized legally oriented works available to the
public generally; professional meetings and bar association seminars."' Examples of genuinely "atypical" sources of external information might include cases when Justices unofficially seek the advice of persons of unusual knowledge and experience regarding a
certain question. For instance, one respondent to the questionnaire
noted that at the time of DeFunis v. Odegaard'7 a law professor at
a nearby university was said to have "received a query about the
LSAT from 'the Supreme Court' and that after reading Douglas'
dissent, he thought he could identify the source of the query." As
another example, an anonymous respondent, who refused to specify
cases for reasons of confidentiality, observed that Court members
receive "[t]hrough law clerks (generally) working through still
third persons, . . . unpublished manuscripts and studies, some-

times statistical studies, on pending matters."
Justices also have been said to receive special data from federal
agencies and their officials. Thus one professor of law observed:
"I understand (but do not know of my own knowledge) that in the
Roth case the Solicitor General's office sent over to the Court a box
full of samples of hard core pornography seized in the mails. This
box was not part of the record."' 3 Beyond that, Court members may
maintain close associations with friends and political contacts with
9
strong views on questions related to those decided by the Court.2
One illustration relayed by a law professor was that a Nixon appointee to the Court, who "was an intimate of the White House,"
personally "went over to congratulate Nixon on the decision to
bomb Cambodia." The same Justice "was a voice on the Court
denying [certiorari] to the various anti-Vietnam cases." A more
recent example, but perhaps one of questionable authenticity, is
John Dean's allegation that Chief Justice Warren Burger and former
President Nixon were said to have discussed whether the federal
courts would force the surrender of the Watergate tapes."'
236. For discussion of the Court's past reliance upon some of these sources see S.
GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, supra note 175, ch. 7; D. GREY, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NEWS

MEDIA (1968); P. ROSEN, supra note 135; Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary
Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Newland, Legal Periodicalsand the
United States Supreme Court, 7 KAN. L. REV. 477 (1959).
237. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
238. The reference is to Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
239. See the examples supplied in MURPHY, supra note 205, at 147-49.
240. See Dean Says He Heard That Nixon Was Confident on Tapes Issue, N.Y. Times,

Jan. 15, 1975, § 1, at 16, col. 3. But see Wash. Post, Jan. 18, 1975, § 1, at 4, col. 5. According
to one report, Burger was also one of only three Justices who voted against the Supreme Court
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These hypotheses relating to unorthodox external flows of information follow: when general issues are involved, Justices are more
likely to seek a broader range of information from atypical sources
than they do in specific cases, when more reliance is placed on
orthodox sources. 24' When a case before the Court is exceedingly
controversial, or if it could have a great impact upon American
society generally, the Justices may seek out additional unorthodox
sources of information upon which to base their decision.2A Future
research should endeavor to substantiate such hypotheses, notwithstanding that these attempts would of necessity be partly based on
hearsay from those closest to the Court. To be sure, first-hand
knowledge is both scarce and confidential on information flows to
the Justices of the Supreme Court.
C. Adding Schema Theory
A principal aspect of information flow is the internalized processing of that information by the Justices themselves. This aspect
has been referred to thus far only generally in terms of Court members' personally construing information in view of their own attitudes, backgrounds, and experiences.23 Of course, there is much
more to it than this, and "schema theory," as recently developed by
Robert Axelrod,1" seems to hold some promise as one way of conceptualizing this facet of information-flow processing by members of
the Supreme Court. Though little is known about the internal
thought patterns of past and present Justices, except for what they
have been willing to reveal through their own writings and personal
papers,2 45 schema theory at least provides a broad way of conceiving
accepting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). See Totenberg, supra note 174, at 58.

Once the case was accepted, however, Burger assigned himself to be the opinion writer and
his first draft "met with a wholly negative response" from his brethren. Id. at 67.
It should further be noted that historically there have occurred atypical flows of information from the Justices to the outside environment. Perhaps the most widely cited examples
are the leaks of information by Mr. Justice Curtis to a national newspaper and by Mr. Justice

Catron to President-elect Buchanan, both concerning the Court's unannounced decision in
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See J. SCHMmHAUSER, supra note 197,
at 117, 119; C. SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY, supra note 216, at 488-89, 495-502.
241. Hypothesis suggested in the questionnaire response of Bradley C. Canon, Professor
of Political Science, University of Kentucky.
242. See Table 4 in Appendix A infra.
243. See note 151 supra and accompanying text.
244. Axelrod, Schema Theory: An Information Processing Model of Perception and
Cognition, 67 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1248 (1973).
245. See, e.g., A. MASON, supra note 191; W. MURPHY, supra note 205; Danelski, Conflict
and Its Resolution in the Supreme Court, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTON 71 (1967); Howard, On
the Fluidity of Judicial Choice, 62 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 43 (1968); Ulmer, Bricolage and Assorted Thoughts on Working in the Papers of Supreme Court Justices, 35 J. OF POL. 286
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probable patterns of decisional thinking from the standpoint of information processing. The word "schema" connotes a perception of
reality, a concept of how things work. As employed here, it describes
an individual Justice's conception of what the law is-or what it
should be. Put otherwise, given a Supreme Court Justice's schema
he receives new information from various sources and attempts to
2 48
interpret it in light of his existing information.
Axelrod's schema model, shown in Figure 9, thus depicts in
flow-chart fashion how a Justice may receive and process new information. At the risk of oversimplification, and for purposes of the
exploratory model, Axelrod's schema theory may be broadly interpreted in the following manner. Receiving information (such as that
in a writ of certiorari or an oral argument before the Court) at point
1, the Justice usually knows the source and type of information
involved. He internally processes the message to point 2, answering
the question: "Is there already an interpretation of this case?"'24
If the answer is affirmative (box 3), the Justice then determines
whether the most recent information is congruent with the old. Consideration is given to what the Court had previously held in these
questions, or what special factors might suggest the desirability of
distinguishing or even overruling precedent. If the new information,
as interpreted by the Justice, does seem generally to correspond
with the old on this issue, as often happens, his processing of the
information is comparatively simple. He advances to point 11,
where his confidence in the prior information is enhanced,
and-with perhaps minor adjustments-his decision (communication to his colleagues and then to the larger Court environment) is
for the most part expected and consistent with prior rulings. By
contrast, if the answer is negative in box 3, the Justice weighs the
credibility of past information versus the most recent and determines which one of them is not credible (points 5 and 6). If the new
(1973); Ulmer, The Longitudinal Behavior of Hugo Lafayette Black: ParabolicSupport for
Civil Liberties, 1937-1971, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 131 (1973).
246. More specifically, in the words of Axelrod, schema theory:
is about how a single person observes and makes sense out of a complex environment.
Therefore it describes the perceptual and cognitive processes of a single person; it does
not describe the functioning of a small group, let alone a social movement or a government. Furthermore, it describes how a person processes information and tries to make
sense out of it, but it does not describe how he makes policy decisions.
Axelrod, supra note 244, at 1249.
247. Id. at 1251. For the sake of simplicity, notice that the use here of Axelrod's model
is largely commonsensical and necessarily oriented toward basic legal concepts. Thus, his
more sophisticated concepts and definitions are not adopted. As an illustration, Axelrod
defines "case" as "a specific instance in time." Id. at 1250. His question, however, is borrowed
here, using "case" in the normal legal sense.
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FIGURE 9
AXELROD'S SCHEMA MODEL

Enter

Receive a message:
source name
partial specification
of a case
case type.

2
Is there already an interpretation of this case?

6

I

Blame old interpretation:
downgrade old source's
credibility, cancel
previous interpretation.
Succeed

9
Satisfied: seek a schema
which provides a satisfici
fit to the partial specification of the case.
Fail
10
Downgrade source
credibility.

Exit without
Specify: modify and extend
specification using the
selected schema, upgrade
accessibility of the schema,
upgrade source credibility,
upgrade confidence in the
interpretation.

interpretation

Exit with new interpretation
Source: Axelrod, Schema Theory: An Information Processing Model of Perception and
Cognition, 67 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 1248, 1251 (1973).
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information's reliability is undermined, then the Justice accepts the
old interpretation. On the other hand, if the old information is found
to lack credibility, the Justice combines it with the new information
at box 8.248
Now return to box 2. If the answer was that no prior interpretation exists in this case, then information processing by the individual Justice follows another path. If there is "old uninterpreted information on this case, ' ' 241 it is combined with the most recent (point
8) and a fresh schema emerges. If there is not, then the Justice has
even more discretion in making a decision, since he is not required
to take into consideration past credible information. When this new
schema "succeeds, 2 150 the Justice is then able confidently to com'251
nunicate a new interpretation to his colleagues. When it "fails,
then essentially he is unable to make a decision in the case, because
his individual information processing fails for one reason or an.2
51
other.
Figure 10 integrates the individual information processing aspect with Figure 8, completing the exploratory model of information
flow to, through, and from members of the United States Supreme
Court. 253 Although provisional, it is of assistance in further describing and explaining how the Justices make public policy based upon
a certain quantum of information. And it is a valid model in the
sense that "[i]ts 'validity' depends . . . upon its utility in furthering fruitful research or in increasing our understanding of reality. ' ' 254
248. See Axelrod's discussion id.
249. Id. at 1251.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1250.
252. See Axelrod's discussion id.
253. The schema model is included under the input-oral argument-court in session
portion of Figure 8, for here is where much of the information processing by each Justice
presumably takes place. This is not to preclude the possibility, however, that a similar process
occurs when a Justice decides whether the Court should initially accept the case, or as he
participates in the policy-making process after oral argument.
254. W. MURPHY, supra note 205, at 32.
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AN EXPLORATORY MODEL OF
JUDICIAL INFORMATION FLOw
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"At this point there may occur varying degreesof information exchange among the Justices.
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ADDITIONAL PROPOSITIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

The flow of information to the Supreme Court is an essential
feature of that institution's operation and substantially influences
its policy-making process. Although Figure 10 is based largely on a
detailed study of only three major constitutional decisions, plus
three bodies of general theory, it nevertheless illustrates the potential utility of a model for contributing to an understanding of the
Court.25

That structure, within a limited amount of space, helps one to
visualize the overall information flow process at the Supreme Court
level, rather than in a piecemeal fashion-such as emphasizing only
external or internal information flows or, even more narrowly, their
component parts. It organizes ideas, events, and data pertaining to
that process. It suggests likely relationships between strategic variables; for instance, the effect of information inputs on a Court decision may be strengthened or weakened by the Court's procedural
rules, institutional traits, or by the backgrounds and predilections
of the Justices. Finally the model may be interpreted to suggest
propositions that go beyond those examined by Miller and Barron,
and that therefore may deserve future investigation.
A. Illustrative Hypotheses
Professors Miller and Barron assert that their propositions generally hold for Roe, Doe, and Times. This article, with a few stated
exceptions, 56 accepts those propositions as reliable. Additionally,
their analysis of the Abortion Cases and Times-in combination
with the models developed here-seems to indicate additional, related hypotheses or propositions that could be fruitfully explored by
future research. This study has provided or suggested a number of
hypotheses throughout, of which some were conceived during the
case studies, some offered by insightful questionnaire responses, a
few generated from the exploratory model in Figure 10, and still
others derived from cited research. While a number of variables are
involved, each of these hypotheses pertains to judicial information
flow, broadly defined. The basic communication model in Figure 5
provides useful organizing concepts for presenting these illustrative
hypotheses, although admittedly they do not always fit neatly into
these conceptual categories. A more systematic statement of these
hypotheses appears below.
255.
B infra.
256.

See the discussion of how models maybe employed for useful purposes in Appendix
See the evaluation presented notes 163-68 supra and accompanying text.
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1. WHO is the sender of the message? (Source of information)
-When general issues are involved, Supreme Court Justices are
more likely to seek and receive a broader range of information
from a variety of sources than in narrow cases, in which 2 they
57
tend to rely more on orthodox sources of legal information.
-When a Supreme Court decision is likely to have a profound
impact on American society, the Justices of the Court inform
themselves through both orthodox and unorthodox sources so as
to have available the most adequate, reliable, and timely information upon which to base their decision.
-In some instances the Supreme Court has an inadequate opportunity to check the sources of information relied upon by
litigants and the conclusions derived from those sources.
-When sources of information are not or cannot be thoroughly
checked, the Court may nevertheless rely upon that data if the
pressures from its environment are so strong as to require authoritative policy from an "apolitical" institution.
2.

WHAT is the message communicated? (Content)
-Social science data seems to have more influence in areas of
new judicial policy, as opposed to when a long line of legal precedents exists.
-"Continued denial of certiorari with respect to a given subject
will decrease the number of cases filed concerning that subject."28
-A Supreme Court opinion unpopular with a large portion of
the population will generate more negative information flow
back to to the Court than will one that is generally accepted and
complied with.
-The variety of information presented to the Court is a direct
function of the impact a particular decision may have on society.

3. HOW is the message communicated? (Process of
communication)
-The kind of information made available to the Court, to the
extent that information is reflected in sources such as briefs and
lower court records, will vary with the type of lawyer arguing the
case. 259
257. Hypothesis suggested in the questionnaire response of Bradley C. Canon, Professor
of Political Science, University of Kentucky.
258.

S. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, supra note 209, at

259.

Hypothesis derived from J.

CASPER,

supra note 192.
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information is communicated to the Supreme Court

through typical means, it may undergo varying degrees of processing, screening, and condensation prior to reaching the Justices.
-When unorthodox information reaches Supreme Court Justices, it does so through indirect channels, thus avoiding the
normal processing-screening-condensation procedure.
-Although atypical flows of information are not processed,
screened, and condensed in the traditional sense, they may
nevertheless significantly affect judicial policy-making.
4.

To WHOM does the message go? (Recipients)
-The more atypical the type of information being communicated to the Justices, the greater the likelihood that it will go
through fewer and more covert channels.
-Assuming that counsel feel they can predict how most of the
Justices will vote on a particular issue, they will direct their
strategy in briefs and arguments toward the "swingmen" on the
Court in order to win those votes, based upon their understanding of those Justices' backgrounds, attitudes, and experiences.
-When contrasted with more typical cases, considerably more
exchange of information and views occurs among the Justices in
major constitutional cases-informally through Court memoranda, over the telephone, or through face-to-face discussions
during the opinion writing process.

5.

With what EFFECT(Information'sinfluence on the decision)
-Information coming to the Court influences the Justices in
the determination of whether or not to decide a case.
-Occurrences in the Court's environment may influence the
Justices to disregard certain facts and arguments that conflict
with what they feel is "right" for the society, the economy, or
the political system at a particular time.
-The Supreme Court relies upon information and data used in
the lower court record according to the extent to which that
information supports its own policy preferences, and depending
on the prestige of the lower court or judge within the judicial
system generally.
-When an important case is before the Court, the Justices will
take more time to weigh the information, and will more fully
explain and document their holding.6 0

260. Hypothesis suggested in the questionnaire response of Henry J. Abraham, Professor of Political Science, University of Virginia.
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-When information is transmitted to the Court, it is viewed by
the Justices not only with respect to the possible impact of future alternative decisions, but also with respect to the impact of
prior decisions in such issues.
-The Supreme Court may utilize its policy-making power in
stating broad standards in order to prevent a future multitude
of cases and the accompanying influx of information.
-In cases when the Justices possess intense feelings as to how
a case should be decided, they may totally ignore information
presented in briefs and arguments that contradict that view, but
draw upon other data similarly presented to support their preconceived notions.
-During the opinion writing process, the Justices not assigned
to author the opinion pay little attention to the specific information relied upon in opinion drafts, instead giving primary notice
to whether the opinion's thrust is generally in the direction they
support.
B.

Suggested Lines of Future Research

To the extent that these hypotheses are related and later shown
to be valid, a theory of Supreme Court information flow may be
forthcoming. At this time, however, the hypotheses vary in importance, comprehensiveness, relatedness, the extent to which they are
obvious or have been examined, and their ability to be operationalized, quantified, measured, and thus tested. The hypotheses nevertheless suggest that future research should proceed along at least
three general but distinct lines. One should concern model testing,
another should relate the model to specific problems of the Supreme
Court, and a third should address the more technical question of
assessing and improving the Supreme Court's information retrieval
system.
First, the model should be tested and further refined. This
could be achieved through qualitative analysis such as that in this
study, or through quantitative methods such as those involved in
multivariate analysis." 1 Quantitatively, the objective would be to
measure accurately the sources and effects of different types of information in a larger number of Supreme Court decisions. Fred
Kort's use of regression analysis and discriminant analysis may pro261. For an introductory discussion of multivariate techniques see W. MURPHY & J.
TANENHAUS, THE STUDY OF PUBLIC LAW 205-12 (1972). See also H. BLALOCK, JR., SOCIAL
STATISTICS (1960); W. BUCHANAN, UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL VARIABLES (1969); G. TINTNER,
ECONOMETRICS (1952).
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vide some insights in this respect. In a 1973 article his purpose was
to discover "whether or not the Supreme Court's acceptance of the
fact that the defendant was not advised of his right to counsel in
an involuntary confession case depends on the appearance of the
fact in the lower court records and appellate briefs. '11 2 Essentially,
Professor Kort applied these two techniques in examining the presence and apparent influence of types of information ("facts") presented in lower briefs and records. These facts may or may not have
ultimately come to the attention of the Justices in thirty-two confession rulings announced between 1936 and 1964. Most importantly
for future research, Kort noted that "[a] similar inquiry can be
made, of course, with regard to any other fact."2 ' Kort's research
in this sense is directly relevant to future quantitative studies of
judicial information flow. By using multivariate techniques, such
research would test relationships between information variables
2 4
through causal analysis.
The second line of future inquiry should involve the application
of the model to Supreme Court problems; for example, the current
case overload. Using this illustration, the refined model could be
employed to indicate where and how Supreme Court information
flow could be modified to ease the pressures of the escalating growth
of docketed cases. 265 The concept being advocated is this: while
there clearly exists an increasing case overload at the Supreme
Court level, an equally valid means of analyzing the problem is in
terms of information overload. This is a logical approach since the
growth of the Court's case load is only part of its problem. The other
262.
263.
264.

Kort, Regression Analysis and DiscriminantAnalysis, supra note 6.
Id. See also Kort's other articles cited at note 6 supra.
See, e.g., H. BLALOCK, JR., CAUSAL INFERENCES IN NONEXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH
(1964); S. KILPATRICK, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL DATA (1974); Kort, A Special and
a General Multivariate Theory of Judicial Decisions (unpublished revision of a paper origi-

nally presented at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Ass'n).
265.

For accounts of the Court's case overload and possible solutions see, e.g., A.
Do ABOUT IT

BICKEL, THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT-AND WHAT, IF ANYTHING, To

(1973); COMMISSION ON REvISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND
INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE ch. 2 (1975); Alsup, A Policy Assessment of the National Court of Appeals, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1313 (1974); Black, The National
Court of Appeals: An Unwise Proposal,83 YALE L.J. 883 (1974); Brennan, The National Court
of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 473 (1973); Burger, supra note 234; Casper
& Posner, supranote 225; Douglas, The Supreme Court and Its Case Load, 45 CORNELL L.Q.
401 (1960); Freund, Why We Need the National Court of Appeals, 59 A.B.A.J. 247 (1973);
Gressman, The National Court ofAppeals: A Dissent, 59 A.B.A.J. 253 (1973); Griswold, supra
note 234; Poe, Schmidt, & Whalen, A National Court of Appeals: A Dissenting View, 67 Nw.
U.L. REv. 842 (1973). Of course much of this recent debate has centered around the proposed
creation of a National Court of Appeals which would perform a major screening function for
the Supreme Court.
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part is that each additional case may create a drain on the Justices'
time by stimulating multiple flows of information to the Court as
an institution, to its staff and law clerks, and then to the Justices.
These increases in information come from external sources, but also
generate further internal flows, thereby contributing to the "rationing of justice,"2 ' just as is true with case overload. In the final
analysis, a refined model of judicial information flow could be useful
in indicating where the Court's procedures should be slightly
changed, basically altered, or completely modified to promote an
effective and efficient flow of information to the Justices. Thus the
model could facilitate thinking concerning "the abstract properties
of alternative institutional arrangements.""2 7 Through this approach
it should then be possible to stimulate support for appropriate
changes and, thus in the long-run, "to conserve a scarce resource in
the judiciary, the unexpandable time of the nine justices of the
Supreme Court of the United States.""28
A third area for investigation, which is indirectly related to this
study, should concern the application of computer-based information retrieval systems to the courts. Chief Justice Earl Warren was
aware of some of the early potential in these developments in 1966
when he observed: "It seems to me there is a definite need for
266. Griswold, supra note 234. Dean Griswold explains this concept in the following
terms:
What has been happening is that as the number of cases filed has steadily increased,
the Court has been forced to make its cut a higher and higher point on the overall list.
This means inevitably that cases which would have been regarded as worthy of review
fifty or twenty years ago cannot be heard today. In other words, they must be rationed
out.
Id. at 340-41.
267. Fiorina, supra note 8, at 147.
268. Cannon, Administrative Change and the Supreme Court, 57 JUDICATURE 334
(1974). To be sure, attempts are being made to conserve the Justices' time. Although change
in the judicial process at the Supreme Court level has traditionally been slow, the creation
in 1972 of a new position-the administrative assistant to the Chief Justice-was a milestone
development. Mark W. Cannon, the first professional administrator to hold that post, has
since his appointment been able to modernize a few aspects of the Court's institutional
functioning. In the area most relevant to this article, Cannon recently observed that sometime
in the near future, perhaps during 1976, "the docket records of the Court will be processed
through an efficient information and management system." Cannon, An Admini3trator's
View of the Supreme Court, 22 FED. BAR NEWS 109, 110 (1975). Moreover, Cannon is looking
toward ways to overcome "the inadequate resources for assisting the Justices as they process
a caseload almost four times as great as it was when Brandeis sat on the Court." Id. at 111.
One means of accomplishing this objective is through the adoption of a career legal staff.
Moving in this direction, Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice White have recently substituted an experienced lawyer for one of their law clerk positions. Id. at 112. See also Cannon,
The FederalJudicial System: Highlights of Administrative Modernization, 12 CRIMINOLOGY
10 (1974); Wasby, supra note 188, at 3. Although these innovations are helpful, they do not,
however, alleviate many of the problems resulting from information-related inadequacies.
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thorough analysis and study of the mechanics-in its physical aspects-of carrying on the business of our courts. I am led to this
belief by the accomplishments of new data processing methods
employed in other fields ..
"
With regard to the Supreme
Court, there is a need to analyze its information systems and their
general updating. Pertinent questions that might extend the findings of this study could include the following. What types of information do the Justices ideally need in a variety of cases? How may
these needs be met through technological innovations? What advantages or disadvantages would accrue from the use of a sophisticated
information system to meet these needs? Is there, in fact, resistance
to a more sophisticated information system at the Supreme Court
level? If so, why? Is there general judicial conservatism toward
change; resistance to altering the Court's procedures; fear of loss of
control; or are opponents of such a system simply uninformed as to
the problems it could solve? 270 This entire area of computer application to legal information-flow processes has received increasing attention over the last decade and should continue to do S0.271
VI.

CONCLUSION

The flow of information to the United States Supreme Court is
an indispensable, distinctive characteristic of the American judiciary that has been virtually ignored, in the systematic sense, by
students of the legal process. This information-flow process is composed of multiple aspects that contribute to the complexity and
discretion of the Court's policy-making role and to the mythology
that surrounds it as a governmental institution. To be sure, the
Court at times decides cases based strictly upon the record, briefs,
and oral arguments presented to the Justices. The assertion here,
however, is that in major constitutional cases in which the Justices
choose to formulate new broad social policy-as in New York Times
v.Sullivan, Roe v. Wade, and Doe v. Bolton-a number of other
269. Address by Earl Warren, Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute, Washington, D.C., May 18, 1966, at 9, quoted in Chartrand, Systems Technology and Judicial
Administration,52 JUDICATURE 194 (1968).
270. For a more detailed treatment of this question see E. ADAMS, COURTS AND
COMPUTERS (1972). Note especially ch. 9 where the author elaborates upon the position that
"[p]rogress in applying technology in the courts has often been retarded by the many
unfounded ideas surrounding both machines and the law." Id. at 117.
271. See generally E. FRIESEN, E. GALLAs, & N. GALLAS, MANAGING THE COURTS (1971);
H. ZEiSEL, H. KAvEN, JR., & B. BucHHoLz, DELAY INTHE COURT (1959); Adams, The Move
Toward Modern Data Management in the Courts, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 250 (1971); Freed,
Computers in JudicialAdministration,2 LAw & COMPUTER TECH., July 1969, at 19; Halloran,
JudicialData Centers, 2 LAW & COMPUTER TEcH., Apr. 1969, at 9; Kleps, Computers and
Court Management, 53 JUDICATURE 322 (1970); Tamm, Are Courts Going the Way of the
Dinosaur? 57 A.B.A.J. 228 (1971).
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things may happen. The Justices may liberally pick and choose
from the totality of information brought to their attention, or they
may entirely disregard it on specific critical points that supply the
premises underlying important constitutional policy. At times they
encourage counsel to present a spectrum of policy options and may
actually suggest that counsel extend his argument to broader constitutional grounds. They are known to conduct additional independent research on their own, often with the assistance of their law
clerks, which results in policy premises complementing, supplementing, or radically differing from those emerging from the adversary process. The Justices, as major fact-finders, periodically recognize some of this information through the liberal utilization of judicial notice, a practice that clearly may be affected by the Justices'
backgrounds, experiences, and attitudes. They may also neglect to
acknowledge that they are in fact taking notice and simply declare
expansive policies that have the authority of law but are not thoroughly tested through adversary proceedings.
These considerations, among others, have been weighed in constructing an exploratory model of Supreme Court information flow.
Portions of that final model, based upon the "preliminary" revisionist findings of Professors Arthur S. Miller and Jerome A. Barron, are
essentially inductive in nature. Deductive aspects of the model were
then selectively added from systems theory, communicationinformation theory, and schema theory. One key point, however,
requires underscoring: the present article is not designed to provide
the ultimate model of information flow to the Justices of the Supreme Court in all constitutional cases. Rather, it is intended to be
tentative, suggestive, and exploratory-but, in any event, hopefully
controversial. In the final analysis, the overall effort will prove
worthwhile only to the extent that it stimulates further thought and
the development of more refined models by others interested in
judicial process, Supreme Court policy-making, and information
flow. With this in mind, a number of propositions have been suggested that may prove testable through future research. Ultimately,
quantitative analysis should be applied carefully to the information
flow process, models should be operationalized to the point of actually contributing solutions to very real problems faced by the
Supreme Court, and the Court's information retrieval system
should be objectively assessed for its efficiency and effectiveness in
support of the policy-making function. If these objectives are accomplished, the process of informing the judicial mind will become
better understood by the academic community, thoughtful and concerned citizens, and even the Justices who make future policy
within the inner chambers of the Supreme Court.
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APPENDIX A
ACADEMIC VIEWS RELATING TO SUPREME COURT INFORMATION FLOW

Since a paucity of work had been published specifically addressing the subject of information flow to the Supreme Court, a
questionnaire was designed during 1974 requesting the opinions of
law and political science professors on certain relevant points and
asking how the larger study could be made useful to their disciplines. These questions were included:
1. What have been, to your knowledge, the principal ways in
which Justices of the Supreme Court have typically informed
themselves on issues brought before them for decisions? More
specifically, what have been the ordinary sources of information
2
and the usual means whereby it has been communicated? 2
2. What illustrative cases are you aware of where Supreme Court
Justices have gained, through atypical means, information pertaining (directly or indirectly) to cases decided by the Court?
3. Our major objectives include: (a) identification and analysis
of information flow in six prominent lines of Supreme Court
decisions; (b) the development of the early stages of descriptive
models of information flow to the Court; and (c) the generation
of information flow hypotheses for future research. Which of
these themes would you consider to be the most fruitful lines of
inquiry? What other objectives would be useful to pursue?
4. At this time, we are weighing the possibilities of utilizing such
approaches as systems theory, communication/information
models, and "schema theory" (see Axelrod, Schema Theory: An
Information Processing Model of Perception and Cognition, 67
AM. POL. ScI. REV. 1248 (1973)) in developing models of judicial
information flow. Of these models or bodies of theory, which
would you consider to be most suitable for describing the flow
of information to the Supreme Court? Why? What other models
or theories might be worth exploring in this project?
5. With regard to the flow of information, how should or could
the adversary system be modified to improve its functioning and
to facilitate the fulfillment of its purposes in constitutional adjudication at the Supreme Court level? What should be the role
of social science data at the Supreme Court level? What revisions in Supreme Court practice would be necessary to integrate
the social science factor into the work of the Court?
272. Another point originally included in the questionnaire, but of no direct relevance
here because of the wide distribution of responses, was: "Please make any additional comments on any aspect of this project."
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6. Finally, in this study it is obvious that we are focusing on
cases which illustrate major revisions in the law which have been
accomplished by the Supreme Court. What, if any, differences
are there in the way the Court informs itself when it decides
cases which result in fundamental social change and when it
makes less controversial interpretive decisions?
During the following weeks 175 questionnaires were distributed
to students of the Supreme Court throughout the nation. Approximately two-thirds (117) of these went to law professors, one-third
(58) to political scientists. Forty-one replies were received from the
survey effort, yielding a response rate of 23.4 percent. Of the twentyeight respondents who identified themselves, eighteen were law professors and ten were political scientists.
This appendix presents and interprets the more important data
collected from the questionnaire responses.273 Two points, however,
require particular emphasis: the sample is not scientifically random
and the data are not always sufficient in quantity for statistical
tests. Thus, conclusions are tentative and there is no reason to believe that the views expressed in these questionnaire responses necessarily reflect the views of law professors and political scientists
generally. Yet, with this fact in mind, the data are presented as an
appendix, for they are quite interesting and suggest directions for
possible future research.
In presenting the data the procedure will first be to discuss it
in terms of total responses, and then in terms of opinions voiced by
members of the two disciplines who identified themselves. These
tables reflect data on several topics, introduced in the following
order: the use of social science data for policy-making by the Supreme Court (Table 1); the need for structural changes at the Supreme Court level to insure the availability of more complete, valid,
and reliable information (Table 2); atypical sources of information
available to the Justices (Table 3); the differences in the way the
Court informs itself in decisions that are likely to be controversial
or to have a major impact on American society, as opposed to those
that in all likelihood will not (Table 4); and, finally, the use of and
familiarity with models as they relate to Supreme Court information flow (Tables 5, 6 and 7).
273. For a more general but somewhat related study of academic attitudes of political
scientists interested in judicial behavior, judicial process, and public law see Schubert,
Academic Ideology and the Study of Adjudication, 61 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 106 (1967).
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TABLE 1

ACADEMIC ATrITUDES TowARD
THE SUPREME COURT'S USE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA*

(N = 33)

Law Professors Political Scientists Anonymous Totals
Generally appear to think
7 (21.2%)
the Supreme Court should
regularly consider social
science data wherever related
to a particular policy question

8 (24.2%)

6 (18.2%)

21 (63.6%)

Generally appear to think the 8 (24.2%)
Supreme Court should not
consider social science data
on a regular basis

0

4 (12.1%)

12 (36.4%)

Totals

8 (24.2%)

10 (30.3%)

33 (100.0%)

15 (45.4%)

*Percentages are rounded and calculated according to total responses. When percentages are
calculated according to disciplines, without consideration of anonymous responses, differences in the views of law professors and political scientists are significant at the .02 level.
See the reference cited at note 275 for the use of the chi square test.

Academic views toward the Supreme Court's use of social science data are the focus of Table

1.214

Sixty-three point six percent

(63.6%) of all respondents generally thought that the Court should
regularly consider social science data when it clearly is related to a
particular policy question, whereas 36.4 percent did not favor the
consideration of social science data on a regular basis. When anonymous responses are ignored, all responding political scientists favored the Court's use of social science data, but less than half of the
responding law professors concurred. This difference is statistically
significant, 25 and is evident in typical responses to the question.
Political scientists were prone to observe that social science data
"should be used as the basis for judicial policy-to provide information permitting a better informed judgment," or that "social scientists [should] be able to present their data to the court (on the
court's invitation) in both written form and orally explicated." On
the other hand, law professors were more apt to display a basic
skepticism and distrust of social science data, saying, for example,
"It is useful for courts,

. . .

not as definitive guidelines for decisions

but as more or less organized general information, thoughtful gossip,

274. See question 5 supra.
275. Two tests, the chi square and the Fisher exact test of significance, were used to
test the statistical significance of differences in views expressed by political science and law
professors. For an explanation of these tests and when they may be applied see S. SIEGEL,
NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

96-104, 175-79 (1956).
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low level social statistics or head-counting, and the like," or even
more strongly, "social science data is too imprecise, too subject to
the bias of those who compile it, too open to attack, and too subject
to change radically over a relatively short time period, to provide a
viable basis on which to decide constitutional principles."
TAiBL 2
ACADEMIC ATTITUDES TOWARD STRUCTURAL CHANGES
AT THE SUPREME COURT LEVEL TO INSURE MORE COMPLETE, RELIABLE, AND VALID INFORMATION*

(N = 22)

Law Professors Political Scientists Anonymous Totals
Generally appear to favor
structural changes at the
Supreme Court level

6 (27.3%)

4 (18.2%)

5 (22.7%)

15 (68.2%)

Generally appear to oppose
structural changes at the
Supreme Court level

2 (9.1%)

4 (18.2%)

1 (4.5%)

7 (31.8%)

Totals

8 (36.4%)

8 (36.4%)

6 (27.3%)

22 (100.0%)

*Percentages are rounded and calculated according to total responses. When anonymous
responses are disregarded, the Fisher exact test of significance shows that differences in the
opinions of political scientists and law professors are not statistically significant.

Table 2 addresses the question whether the respondents favored
structural changes in the adversary system at the Supreme Court
level to insure more complete, valid, and reliable information upon
which to base judicial decisions.27 Of twenty-two replies, 68.2 percent favored structural changes; 31.8 percent appeared generally to
oppose them. The data were also examined from the standpoint of
disciplines, not total responses. Perhaps surprisingly, the finding is
that three-fourths of the law professors seemed to advocate structural change, while only half of the political scientists did so. Although most law professors seemed either to advocate structural
changes or to maintain open minds, political scientists appeared
more cautious and frequently responded "I favor no particular drastic reform."
Responses regarding "atypical" flows of information to the
Supreme Court appear in Table 3.27 Of eighteen respondents, onethird expressed the view that atypical information included extrajudicial experience or the expertise of the Justices, 27.8 percent said
that such information was obtained from governmental officials or
agencies, and 38.9 percent observed that it came from trusted or
276.
277.

See question 5 supra.
See question 2 supra.
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TABLE 3
SELECTED TYPES OF "ATYPICAL" INFORMATION

MENTIONED IN RESPONSES TO QUESTION

2*

(N = 18)
Law Professors Political Scientists Anonymous Totals
Extrajudicial experience or
expertise of the Justices

2 (11.1%)

3 (16.7%)

1 (5.6%)

6 (33.3%)

Obtaining unusual information 2 (11.1%)
from governmental officials
or agencies

0

3 (16.7%)

5 (27.8%)

Information from trusted or
experienced persons,
political contacts, etc.

3 (16.7%)

1 (5.6%)

3 (16.7%)

7 (38.9%)

Totals

7 (38.9%)

4 (22.2%)

7 (38.9%) 18 (100.0%)

*Percentages are rounded and calculated according to total responses. When percentages are
calculated according to the two disciplines, the Fisher exact test of significance reveals that
the differences in opinion of political scientists and law professors are not statistically significant.

experienced persons or political contacts. It is interesting, too, that
more anonymous respondents mentioned specific atypical sources of
information than those who identified themselves. The confidential
nature of some replies may have contributed to the failure of these
respondents to divulge their identity. Table 3 also establishes that
three of four responses from political scientists named extrajudicial
experience or expertise of the Justices as types of atypical information, while replies from law professors were more evenly distributed
among the three types of atypical sources mentioned.
Next are replies to the question: "What, if any, differences are
there in the way the Court informs itself when it decides cases that
result in fundamental social change and when it makes less controversial interpretive decisions?"' As Table 4 indicates, over half the
total responses expressed the view that more information is usually
necessary when the Court's decision will be likely to have a major
impact on American society. Twenty-five percent of the replies suggested that the Court gives more time and attention to information
in controversial areas that will have a major impact, and one
respondent said that in controversial issues the Court presents more
thorough explanations of its decisions and cites more authorities.
Finally, three respondents perceived no major difference in the way
the Justices inform themselves in controversial, as opposed to non278. Question 6 supra.
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TABLE 4
RESPONSES TO QUEMSTON

6:

"What, if any, differences are there in the way the Court informs itself when it decides cases
which result in fundamental social change and when it makes less controversial interpretative
decisions?"*
(N = 20)

Law Professors Political Scientists Anonymous Totals
More information is usually
necessary where the Court's
decision will have a major
impact

2 (10.0%)

5 (25.0%)

4 (20.0%)

11 (55.0%)

The Court gives more time
1 (5.0%)
and attention to information
in controversial areas which
will have a major impact

3 (15.0%)

1 (5.0%)

5 (25.0%)

In controversial issues, the
Court presents a more
thorough explanation of its
decision and cites more
authorities

1 (5.0%)

0

1 (5.0%)

There is often no major
1 (5.0%)
difference in the way the
Justices inform themselves in
controversial as opposed to
noncontroversial decisions

0

2 (10.0%)

3 (15.0%)

Totals

9 (45.0%)

7 (35.0%)

20 (100.0%)

0

4 (20.0%)

*Percentages are rounded and calculated according to total responses. Application of the
Fisher exact test of significance shows that the differences in opinion of political science and
law professors are not statistically significant.

controversial, decisions. Focusing upon differences in reactions by
law professors and political scientists to the same question, Table 4
indicates that 55.6 percent of the political scientists felt that "more
information" is usually the primary distinguishing factor in how the
Justices prepare themselves for an important decision. Half the
responding law professors agreed.
The final three tables relate to models. Table 5 documents that
nineteen respondents expressed an opinion on the value of social
science models or, more specifically, on the usefulness of models for
depicting the information flow process to the Supreme Court.279 One
point plainly emerges: while most replies were less than
enthusiastic, nearly two-thirds of the respondents appeared to think
279. See questions 3 & 4 supra.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:45

TABLE 5

ACADEMIC ATTITUDES TOWARD MODELING
THE INFORMATION FLOW PROCESS TO THE SUPREME COURT*

(N = 19)

Law Professors Political Scientists Anonymous Totals
Generally appear to think
models would be valuable; or

4 (21.1%)

6 (31.6%)

2 (10.5%)

12 (63.2%)

3 (15.8%)

2 (10.5%)

2 (10.5%)

7 (36.8%)

7 (36.8%)

8 (42.1%)

4 (21.1%)

19 (100.0%)

demonstrate a somewhat

favorable attitude toward
social science models
Generally appear to think

models would not be
valuable; or demonstrate a
somewhat unfavorable
attitude toward social science
models
Totals

*Percentages are rounded and calculated according to total responses. The Fisher exact test

of significance shows that the differences in opinions of political scientists and law professors
are not statistically significant.

that a model of the information flow process would be valuable, or
they evinced a somewhat favorable attitude toward social science
models generally. When anonymous respondents in Table 5 are excluded, the data show that 75 percent of the political scientists
favored the development of an information flow model, while 42.9
percent of the responding law professors generally felt that such a
model would not be particularly valuable. Perhaps differences of
opinion are best illustrated by two responses. The first is a political
scientist with a favorable outlook, but with warnings: "DON'T
OVERDO 'MODELS,'.

.

. define what you mean. .

..

Simplicity

here is a virtue." By comparison stands an indifferent remark from
one law professor: "I am not particularly excited about [your developing models of information flow] .

. .

. Nevertheless, more power

to you."
Table 6, with a small N of eleven, extends the findings of Table
5 by depicting academic preferences for specific types of models,
based on positive responses in the preceding table. 8 ' Of eleven positive replies, five suggested that they favored the development of a
communication-information model, one endorsed systems analysis,
two favored some additional type of model, 281 and three voiced no
280. See question 4 supra. One positive response shown in Table 5 indicated no preference for any of the models mentioned in the questionnaire and thus is not included here.
281. One of these political scientists favored a "macro" model; the other supported the
use of schema theory and multivariate analysis.
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TABLE 6
ACADEMIC

PREFERENCE FOR SPECIFIC TYPES OF MODELS*

(N = 11)

Law Professors Political Scientists Anonymous Totals
Generally appear to favor
the development of a
communication/information
model

3 (27.3%)

2 (18.2%)

0

5 (45.4%)

Generally appear to favor
developing a systems model

0

0

1 (9.1%)

1 (9.1%)

Generally appear to favor a
model based on other than
systems or communication/
information concepts

0

2 (18.2%)

0

2 (18.2%)

No preference stated

1 (9.1%)

1 (9.1%)

1 (9.1%)

3 (27.3%)

Totals

4 (36.4%)

5 (45.4%)

2 (18.2%)

11 (100.0%)

*Percentages are rounded and calculated according to total responses.

preference. Examined according to disciplines, with an even smaller
N of nine, three law professors advocated a model based on
information-communication theory, while one stated no preference.
Of the five responding political scientists, two endorsed a
communication-information model, two favored another type of
2
2
approach, and one stated no preference.

1

Lastly, Table 7 depicts academic familiarity with modeling
approaches mentioned in the questionnaire.2

3

1

Of the thirty-seven

responses, 24.3 percent suggested a familiarity with systems analysis, 18.9 percent with communication/information models, and 5.4
percent with schema theory. On the other hand, between 16 and 19
percent of the replies noted an unfamiliarity with, or a lack of understanding of, each of these three approaches. s4 It is also interesting to observe that respondents not divulging their identity on the
questionnaires were more likely to state that they were unfamilar
with, or did not understand, these modeling approaches. When the
282. No test of statistical significance was employed here because of the small number
of responses. It seems obvious, however, from viewing the data that there were no major
differences in academic preferences for specific types of models. Note, though, that political
scientists were more likely to suggest an approach not alluded to in the questionnaire.
283. See question 4 supra. By "familiarity" is meant a general awareness of these
models, not necessarily a detailed understanding of them.
284. Of course there was no assumption that respondents who failed to comment on
these modeling approaches were unfamiliar with them.
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TABLE 7
ACADEMIC FAuAMLARTY wITH MODELING APPROACHES SUGGESTED IN QUESTION 4*
(N = 37)

Law Professors Political Scientists Anonymous Totals
Respondents saying or
suggesting they were familiar
with systems analysis

3 (8.1%)

3 (8.1%)

3 (8.1%)

9 (24.3%)

Respondents saying or
suggesting they were
unfamiliar with or did not
understand systems analysis.

1 (2.7%)

2 (5.4%)

3 (8.1%)

6 (16.2%)

Respondents saying or
suggesting they were familiar
with communication and
information models

3 (8.1%)

3 (8.1%)

1 (2.7%)

7 (18.9%)

Respondents saying or
suggesting they were unfamiliar with or did not
understand communication
and information models

1 (2.7%)

1 (2.7%)

4 (10.8%)

6 (16.2%)

Respondents saying or
suggesting they were familiar
with schema theory
Respondents saying or
suggesting they were
unfamiliar with or did not
understand schema theory
Totals

2 (5.4%)

2 (5.4%)

2 (5.4%)

1 (2.7%)

4 (10.8%)

7 (18.9%)

10 (27.0%)

12 (32.4%)

15 (40.5%)

37 (100.0%)

*Percentages are rounded and calculated according to total responses. In distinguishing the
views of law and political science professors, the chi square shows they were not statistically
different at the .05 level.

data in the table are broken down according to disciplines, the
findings are somewhat as expected: political scientists indicated a
basic understanding of at least one of the three approaches, whereas
four out of ten responses by law professors suggested no familiarity
with any of these.
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B

THE NATURE OF MODELS AND THEIR USEFULNESS

Before beginning the development of a model, answers should
be suggested to a few basic questions regarding this study. First,
why use a model to understand the Supreme Court, and more specifically, judicial information flow? To this the quick response is
both simple and adequate: models are employed-consciously or
unconsciously-in every aspect of our lives, in each function we
perform. Although they may be unsophisticated, taken for granted,
or not perceived as models per se, we usually think in terms of
models, and they have proven useful."- A more thoughtful question
might concern the goals which can be advanced through models that
cannot be more easily undertaken through traditional modes of research. If the use of models is commonplace, what unique objectives
do they serve? The answer is that models, or conceptual schemes,
have long been employed by physical and social scientists for objectives that were otherwise difficult to attain.2 86 The following are

advantages:
(a) models help us visualize complex processes in an overall,
rather than in a piecemeal, manner;
(b) they typically communicate complicated ideas within a very
limited amount of space;
(c) they may uniquely facilitate organization of ideas, events, or
data;
(d) they may reveal important relationships between variables;
(e) models frequently suggest hypotheses that may not previously have been conceived; and
(f) in some instances they assist in the ultimate scientific objectives of explanation, prediction, and verification.2s7
285. In the words of Karl Deutsch:
It seems clear ... that we all use models in our thinking all the time, even though
we may not stop to notice it. When we say that we "understand" a situation, political
or otherwise, we say, in effect, that we have in our mind an abstract model, vague or
specific, that permits us to parallel or predict such changes in that situation of interest
to us.
K. DEUTSCH, THE NERVES OF GOVERNMENT 12 (1966).
286. See generally D. BARNLUND, INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION: SURVEY AND STUDIES
(1968); Y. DROR, PUBLIC POLICYMAKING REEXAMINED (1968); A. KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF
INQUIRY (1964); E. NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE (1961); THE PROCESS OF MODEL-BUILDING
INTHE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (R. Stogdill ed. 1970); Brodbeck, Models, Meaning, and Theories,
READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 579 (M. Brodbeck ed. 1968).

in

287. Compare these points to the four functions of models discussed in K. DEUTSCH,
supra note 285, at 8-9; S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, supra note 175, at 288-89. See also C.
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An hypothesis underlying this study was that these potential
contributions of models are not universally espoused in academic
circles, regardless of their merit. This proposition was tested
through a questionnaire to determine the extent to which law and
political science professors support the idea of modeling the Supreme Court information flow process."' Broadly speaking, most of
the respondents recognized the benefits of a modeling attempt. Of
those replying to questions on modeling, nearly two-thirds appeared
to think that models would be valuable, or at least voiced a rather
favorable attitude toward social science models generally.8 9 As
might be supposed, however, political scientists maintain more favorable attitudes than law professors toward the need to develop
models of judicial information flow. ' Although this was neither a
large nor a fully representative sampling of academic attitudes,
these data suggest the likelihood that a sizeable portion of legal
scholars do not consider seriously the use of models in their own
personal research, despite the advantages of such an approach.
Since many scholars and commentators do not think in terms
of models, a discussion of additional introductory aspects of modeling would be useful. Strictly speaking, a model should be isomorphic in nature-an abstraction or structure (such as a refined
model airplane or automobile) basically identical in its component
parts to that which it purports to represent.2 Relationships among
components also should be essentially the same as those in reality.
All too often, however, models-particularly those in the social sciences-reflect a simplified version of "what is. '292 In other words,
'293
models are "simplified images of what we think life is really like.
Seldom is there an exact, one-to-one correspondence between the
social science model and the reality upon which it is founded, simply because knowledge of social phenomena only is approaching a
truly "scientific" stage, with verified findings supplying the basis
2
for empirical generalizations. 1
AMERICAN JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 6, at 9-15; Danelski, Toward Explanation of JudicialBehavior, 42 U. CINN. L. REV. 659, 665 (1973); Sheldon, Structuring a Model
of the JudicialProcess, supra note 6, at 1153-54.
288. See Appendix A supra.
SHELDON, THE

289.

See Table 5 in Appendix A supra.

290.
291.

See id.
See Brodbeck, supra note 286.

292.

For some prominent examples of social science models see K. DEUTSCH, supra note

285; A. DOWNS,

AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); D. EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
(1965); J. VON NEUMANN & 0. MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944); W. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS (1962).
293. J. PFIFFNER & F. SHERWOOD, ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 59 (1960).
OF POLITICAL LIFE

294.

Models "cannot be expected to portray accurately every detail of a process or
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Social science models also are relatively scarce and require further testing and refinement. Moreover, some writers insist that few,
if indeed any, social science models are actually "models" in the
sense of an isomorphism based upon empirical theories.295 These
social scientists believe, for example, that no models exist in the
entire political science discipline. In the words of one student of
methodology, "[t]his type of 'model'-an isomorphism between
two empirical theories-is for all purposes nonexistent in political
science; the reason is clearly the lack of any sound scientific theories
of politics."2 ' This assessment also holds for theories of judicial
process and policy-making.
Apart from this, we must bear in mind that models or "premodels" reflect various orientation or form. They have been broadly
classified by one authority as graphic, pictorial, schematic, mathematical, and simulated.2 97 Others use different approaches to classification: structural or functional, linear or nonlinear, physical or
abstract, mathematical or nonmathematical, causal or noncausal,
verbal or symbolic, and so on. With respect to the judiciary, one
recent study explained models according to decision-making, microgroup, role, macro-group, impact, and systems orientations.299
In terms of their sophistication, models may be primarily descriptive, explanatory, or predictive in nature. 299 That is, they may
be used for identification and analysis, for answering "why" questions or, at the most refined level, even for forecasting what will
occur in the future under given conditions. Of course, these three
functions often overlap. Finally, in addition to variances in orientation and sophistication, models may differ in validity, flexibility,
generality, significance, and internal logic. 3 0 These characteristics
may in fact be more vital to a model's usefulness than its form or
degree of sophistication. A simple, graphic, descriptive model may
thus contribute as much or more to knowledge than one that is
mathematical and predictive, provided that the descriptive model
activity, particularly in social behavioral contexts. Their effectiveness is to be measured
primarily by their analytical utility." Mayo & Jones, Legal-Policy DecisionProcess:Alternative Thinking and the Predictive Function, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 318, 349 (1964).
295.

A.

ISAAK, SCOPE AND METHODS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE

142-43 (rev. ed. 1975).
296. Id.
297. G. Lippirr, VISUALIZING CHANGE: MODEL BUILDING AND THE
(1973).
298. C. SHELDON, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 6.

METHODOLOGY OF POLITICAL INQUIRY

299.

300.

CHANGE PROCESS

33

Compare the studies cited at note 6 supra.
For the meaning of these terms and for discussion see R. GOLEMBIEWSKI, W. WELSH,

& W. CROTTY,

A

METHODOLOGICAL PRIMER FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS

430-42 (1969).
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is more valid, flexible, general, significant, and internally logical. In
short, "the model need not satisfy the more difficult criteria-in
particular, prediction and measurement-in order to be judged valuable."3 0'
301.

S. GOLDMAN & T.

JAHNIGE,

supra note 175, at 289.

